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The Minnesota Supreme Court
1965-1966
The Minnesota Supreme Court Note comprehensively
surveys significant decisions of the 1965-1966 term. The
decisions selected were thought to represent new developments in Minnesota law or otherwise to be of interest
to members of the Minnesota Bar. The results reached
by the court are analyzed and evaluated in terms of their
effect upon Minnesota law and are frequently compared
with the law of other jurisdictions. While the decisions
are discussed individually, they are arranged according
to the principal legal issue considered;this arrangement,
however, is merely one of convenience, since many of
the cases involve issues from several areas of the law.

Constitutional Law: Accused Need Not Submit to
Pre-trial Exam by Prosecution Psychiatrists
Anticipating a defense of temporary insanity to a charge of
first degree murder, the state sought and obtained a court order
directing defendant to submit to a pre-trial psychiatric examination. Defendant petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for a
writ of prohibition restraining enforcement of the order. The
court held that by compelling defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination the order violated his privileges against self-2
1
incrimination as guaranteed by the federal and the Minnesotaconstitutions. The court found further that, absent a statutory
grant of authority, trial courts lack power to enter an order permitting the state to administer such a psychiatric examination,
without the consent of the defendant. State v. Olson, 143 N.W.2d
69 (Minn. 1966).
The privilege against self-incrimination grew out of popular
opposition to the inquisitorial practices of the English ecclesias-3
tical and common law courts during the Seventeenth Century.
1.

2.

US. CoNsT. amend. V.

Nn. CoNsT. art. 1, § 7.

3. See 8 WIGmOmE, EVIDENCE § 2250 nn.7, 79, 89 (McNaughton rev.
1961) (hereinafter cited WiGmoRE); Morgan, The Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 34 AMNN. L. REv. 1, 5, 14-15 (1949).
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The privilege was later recognized by the Colonies and today is

guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the federal constitution
4
and the constitutions of most states.
Aside from the area of police interrogation, the United
States Supreme Court has established no formal test to govern
the determination of whether a given extraction of evidence falls
within the proscription of the fifth amendment. The privilege
against self-incrimination is the right to remain silent unless the
defendant chooses to speak "in the unfettered exercise of his
own will."6 The privilege is violated only by acts of compulsion.0
A witness or defendant is protected only from extractions of evi7
dence from his knowledge which "might tend to show" a crime
or could support a conviction 8 or subject him to fines and forfeitures." Within these confines, the Court has urged a broad
and liberal construction of the privilege, 10 and has urged the
states to adopt prosecution discovery procedures which will not
infringe upon individual rights."
Neither the Minnesota nor the federal constitutional prohibition has been construed to extend to extractions of physical
evidence unless the means of extraction is "shocking to the conscience."'12 Such extractions of physical evidence are distinguishable from compelled psychiatric examinations which are extractions of knowledge and psychological evidence from the mind of
the defendant. 13 However, several courts have rejected this distinction and held a compulsory psychiatric examination not
violative of the privilege. 4 Other courts have concluded similarly on the ground that a valid psychiatric diagnosis can be
made without compelling the defendant to speak to the state
4. INBAU, SELF-INcRnvImINATION 3-5 (1950); 8 WIGMORE § 2250; see
Morgan, supra note 3, at 1-23.
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
6. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
7. Id. at 564.
8. Hoffmann v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487 (1951).
9. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 564 (1892).
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
11. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 10, at 467.
12. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); State v.
Emerson, 266 Minn. 217, 221-22, 123 N.W.2d 382, 385-86 (1963).
13. See Green v. State, 222 Ark. 308, 312, 259 S.W.2d 142, 143-44
(1953). "The boundary line is where not just affirmative participation
is essential but defendant's knowledge is extracted from him against his
will." 8 WiGMoRE § 2265, at 400.
14. Noelke v. State, 214 Ind. 427, 15 N.E.2d 950 (1938); Commonwealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950).
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psychiatrist. 5 It has been held in other jurisdictions that, since
the defense of insanity is not a constitutional right but merely a
privilege granted by the state, pleading 6 or proving 17 insanity
can be conditioned upon defendant's cooperation with the state
psychiatrist. The defendant is thus sometimes said to have
waived his privilege against self-incrimination by raising the insanity defense.' 8
The Minnesota Supreme Court found the threat of striking
the insanity defense constitutionally prohibited. The court argued that the principal constitutional defect of the compulsory
psychiatric examination lay in the possibility that evidence obtained through such an examination may be misapplied by the
jury. It assumed that a valid psychiatric examination must include an interview between the defendant and the state psychiatrist, and foresaw that in the course of such an interview the
accused may make inculpatory statements about his actions at
the time of the crime alleged. If these statements were, in any
part, the basis for the psychiatrist's expert opinion, they would
be admissable on the issue of insanity. 9 However, the privilege
against self-incrimination prevents this compelled testimony
from being considered by the jury in determining guilt.20 The
court found instructions from the bench directing the jury not to
apply such testimony to the issue of guilt insufficient to remedy
the danger.

21

15. State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E.2d 506 (1951); INBAU, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 58.
16. Weaver v. State, 215 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ind. 1966).
17. Wis. STAT. § 957.27(2) (1965).
18. State v. Cochran, 356 Mo. 778, 785, 203 S.W.2d 707, 711 (1947).
19. Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Scott v. Hay, 90 Minn. 304, 312, 97 N.W. 106, 109 (1903); State v. Whitlow,
45 N.J. 3, 14, 210 A.2d 763, 770 (1965); see State v. Pearson, 260 Minn.
477, 488, 110 N.W.2d 206, 214-15 (1961); 2 WHARTON, CIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 532, at 378 (12th ed. 1955) (hereinafter cited WHARTON); Roberts,

Some Observations on the Problems of the Forensic Psychiatrist, 1965

Wis. L. REv. 240; Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases,
69 HARv. L. REV. 683, 685-86 (1956).
20. The jury will hear all evidence as to insanity since the constitutional right to trial by jury extends to the issue of insanity. State v.
Brown, 12 Minn. 448, 451 (1866); Bonfati v. State, 2 Minn. 99, 105-09
(1858); 1 WHARTON § 28; see State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 263-64,
262 N.W. 638, 641 (1935); State v. Hanley, 34 Minn. 430, 433, 26 N.W. 397,
398 (1886); State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341, 359 (1868); 2 WHARTON § 532,
at 378.
21. The fear of such jury error was decisive in French v. District
Court, 153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963). See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368, 388 (1964); 51 GEo. L.J. 143, 155 (1962). Contra, In re Spencer, 63
Cal. 2d 400, 406 P.2d 33 passim (1965); State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210
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The court in Olson held the compulsory psychiatric examination forbidden on the additional ground that the trial court
did not have the inherent power to order such an examination
without specific statutory authorization. 22 Other courts have
not been so inhibited. Such power has been found in custom or
in administrative convenience 23 and by analogy to the common
law power to aid indigents, 24 to inquire into defendant's competence for trial,25 or to shape court rules which implement broad
26
statutory power.
The Minnesota court's call for a legislative basis for such
power seems most reasonable. By finding an inherent power,
the many problems raised by the compelled psychiatric examination would remain inadequately resolved. Clearly a legislative
solution is required to define the proper nature and scope of the
examination, to devise effective methods to prevent jury misuse
of psychiatric testimony, and to insure a uniformity of approach.
The reliance of the court on the problem of jury error
suggests that a statute permitting compelled psychiatric examinations could be drawn without transgressing upon the constitutional prohibition.2 7 If compulsory examinations were absolutely proscribed, criminal defendants could fully prepare their
own psychiatric evidence while blocking effective discovery of
their condition by the prosecution. Furthermore, modern polido not apply to
cies underlying the self-incrimination privilege
28
the compulsory psychiatric examination.
A.2d 763 :passim (1965); see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 39-8-2 (3) (1963);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.030 (4) (1965).
22. The statutes presently in force refer solely to pre-trial commitment of mentally unfit defendants and post-trial commitment of those
found not guilty by reason of insanity. MN~. STAT. §§ 631.18, .19 (1965).
23. State v. Mulrine, 183 A.2d 831 (Del. Super. 1962).
24. Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
25. State v. Mulrine, 183 A.2d 831, 833 (Del. Super. 1962).
26. State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965). But see Green
v. State, 222 Ark. 308, 259 S.W.2d 142 (1953).
27. The Olson court stated first that a mid-trial compulsory examination would be permitted, later indicated that no compulsion should be
permitted, and concluded with a negative inference that compulsion
could be authorized only by legislation. State v. Olson, 143 N.W.2d 69,
72, 74, 75 (Minn. 1966).
28. The policies accepted as valid by Wigmore are inapplicable.
There is no danger that the examination will be used to establish prob-

able cause for arrest since it takes place after arrest. The danger of

encouraging lazy police methods is negated since a psychiatric examination is the only scientific method available for discovery of sanity evidence.

See INBAU, SF-INcannNATIoN 6-7 (1949); 8

WIGOORE

§

2252.

Compelled psychiatric exams may not be unreliable. Compare MAcDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND TE CRIKINAL 47, 65-71 (1958); MENNINGER, A
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However, a legislative solution to the problem will satisfy
constitutional requirements only if it contains provisions effectively protecting individual rights. Some courts have suggested
that the defendant be allowed to have a tape recorder or his
lawyer 29 or psychiatrist 0 present and that the use of drugs and
shock treatment be forbidden.3 1 It has also been suggested that
the scope of the interview be limited to the mental state of
the defendant at the time of the crime and the time of the
interview,32 that the transcript of the interview be withheld
from the prosecution until the defendant asserts the insanity
defense,33 and that use of the defendant's statements to the psy34
chiatrist as clues or as links in a chain of evidence be prohibited.
None of these safeguards, however, meets the principal danger seen by the Minnesota court-the practical inability of the
jury to apply psychiatric testimony solely to the issue of guilt.
This danger could be overcome by not allowing the examining
psychiatrist to testify as to statements made by the defendant
concerning the crime.3 5 However, insofar as those statements
form, in any part, the basis for the psychiatrist's expert opinion,
such a solution would cause an undesirable, and perhaps unconstitutional, change in the rules governing expert testimony.
It would diminish the jury's ability to base its decision on inferences drawn from the details underlying the expert opinion.
The expert opinion would tend to become conclusory. The jury
would have little on which it could base its choice between conflicting opinions.
Some jurisdictions have taken a novel approach to the insanity defense by providing a bifurcated trial procedure. Colorado has a statutory procedure whereby the insanity defense can
be tried first to a separate jury at the trial judge's discretion. 30
with Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP ProTosal & the Conn. Statute, 118:2
Am. J. PsYcHiATRY 733 (1962) (GAP Model Statute § 3 (b), embraces
PSYCHIATRIST'S WORLD 732, 735 (1959),

such exams); HOFLnG, TEXTBOOK OF PsYCHIATRY FOR MEDICAL PRACTICE

429-30 (1963); STRECKER, EBAUGH & EWALT, PRACTICAL CLINICAL PsYCHrATRY 452 (8th ed. 1957).
29. State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 28, 210 A.2d 763, 776 (1965) (defense
counsel admitted at state psychiatrist's discretion).
30. Id. at 28, 210 A.2d at 775; see State v. Mulrine, 183 A.2d 831
(Del. Super. 1962).
31. State v. Mulrine, supra note 30.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 29, 210 A.2d 763, 777 (1965).
35. 1964 WIs. L. REV. 671, 682.
36. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 39-8-3, -4 (1963). In French v. District Court, 153 Colo. 10,-384 P.2d 268 (1963), danger that the judge might
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In California the guilt issue is tried first and, if the defendant

is found guilty, his insanity defense is then tried before the same
or a different jury.37 Such a procedure eliminates the danger
of jury misuse without imposing limitations tending to render
the examining psychiatrist's testimony ineffective. If combined
with mechanisms designed to remedy the other problems presented by the compulsory psychiatric examination, this solution
could effectively serve the interest of society favoring prosecudefense without infringing upon
tion discovery of the insanity
38
accused.
the
of
the rights
The conclusions of State v. Olson are harmonious with the
stronger protections afforded the accused by recent Supreme
Court decisions expanding the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination. 39 Certainly some of society's interest in discovery of facts necessary for law enforcement is sacrificed to the
need to provide the accused with an effective guarantee against
the use of compelled testimony in determining his guilt. However, short of the ideal resolution-a procedural change serving
both interests-the rights of the accused are correctly held paramount.
Constitutional Law: County Reapportionment
in Minnesota
Plaintiffs, voters of Olmsted County, brought suit to invalidate two districting plans' adopted by the county board for
try both issues to the same jury made a compulsory exam a violation of
self-incrimination privilege.
37. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026. The objections to this solution are that
it will not allow the prosecution discovery of defendant's mental state
when full insanity is not a defense, and it will double the time and cost
involved.
38. Absent such a procedural change, the defendant's tactical advantage could be partially offset by changing his burden of proof of
insanity from the present fair preponderance of the evidence to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
39. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 346 (1966); Escobedo v. llinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); luAzus~m, INBAu & ARNOLD,
CRnnNAL JUSTIcE IN OUR TIM (1965).
1. Plan I, adopted July 10, 1963, divided the population as follows:
19,182
First District
21,481
Second District
8,708
Third District
9,230
Fourth District
6,931
Fifth District
Plan II, a slight modification of Plan I, was adopted while suit was
pending.
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use in the election of county commissioners. In compliance with
statutory requirements,2 the plans limited the city of Rochester,
containing sixty-two per cent of the county population, to two
out of the five commissioner districts. The trial court held the
plans invalid. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
unanimously, holding that the population disparity among the
commissioner districts violated the equal protection clause of the
federal constitution. 3 Hanlon v. Towey, 142 N.W.2d 741 (Minn.
1966).
Prior to the redefinition of reapportionment standards in
Baker v. Carr4 and Reynolds v. Sims,5 the courts varied in their
willingness to strike down local government reapportionment
plans. Several state courts ruled that the county is merely an
administrative subdivision of the state, wholly under the control
of the legislature. Thus, county apportionment could not be subject to judicial review.6 Other state courts, however, recognized
the right of the courts to set aside improper county apportionment. But the scope of judicial review was limited. These
courts held that since, under their statutes, apportionment of
local election districts was a discretionary function of the designated local officials, election districting could be invalidated only
by showing that local officials had no rational basis for the
7
disparities.
2. Each county shall be divided into as many districts ... as it
has members of the board.... [S]uch districts shall... contain
as nearly as practicable an equal population. Counties may be
redistricted by the county board after each state or federal census, except that no county shall . . . redistrict so that any city

of the second, third or fourth class shall be in more than two
commissioner districts in any one county.
MINN.STAT. § 375.02 (1965). (Emphasis added.)

3. The court in addition relied on MINN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2:
No member of this State Shall be7 disfranchised, or deprived of
any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof,
unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.
4. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
5. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6. E.g., Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 43 So. 2d 514
(La. App.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 339 U.S. 940 (1949). For recent
discussion of these cases see generally Johnson v. Genesee County, X]II
NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 63 (N.D. Mich. 1964).
7. E.g., Ludwig v. Board of Comm'rs of Sapsy County, 170 Neb. 600,
103 N.W.2d 838 (1960). For recent discussion of these cases see generally
Brouwer v. Bronkema, XIII NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS
ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 81 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1964), aff'd, XXXIV
NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 1 (Mich. 1966).
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In Minnesota, prior to Baker v. Carr s apportionment of
county election districts was clearly subject to judicial review.'
From an early date, county election districts were required by
statute to contain "as nearly as practicable equal population."'?
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the statute
to mean that the board of commissioners had broad discretion in
effecting equal population and only abuse of that discretion
would invalidate any redistricting plan."
However, the validity of these older state decisions has become suspect. In a series of recent cases,' 2 the United States
Supreme Court has ruled that the equal protection clause requires that congressional and legislative election districts be
apportioned according to the principle of "one man, one vote."' 3
In a related case concerning city election policies the Supreme
Court, while recognizing that the state in exercising power wholly within its interest is immune from judicial review, reiterated
that this power could not be used to circumvent federally protected rights. 14 The general conclusion drawn from these two
lines of cases is that county residents have a constitutional right
to equally populated election districts. While the functions of
the county government may be wholly under the control of the
state legislature, its exclusive power, through the county board,
to prescribe redistricting standards can not be used to abridge
2
federal rights. 15
8. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. State ex rel. South St. Paul v. Hetherington, 240 Minn. 298, 61
N.W.2d 737 (1953) (1.91-1 ratio approved); State ex rel. Blink v. Cooke,
195 Minn. 101, 262 N.W. 163 (1935).
10.

MINN.

STAT.

§ 375.02 (1965).

11. State ex rel. South St. Paul v. Hetherington, 240 Minn. 298,-.61
N.W.2d 737 (1953).
12. See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado,
377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695"(1964); Davisv.
Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation
v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633
(1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
13. In addition one case implied that the "one man, one vote" principle was applicable to any elected legislative body whether state or
local in nature. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553 (1964).
14. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
15. Delozier v. Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F. Supp. S0 (W.D. Pa.
1965) (school board held elected legislative arm of local go'rernment);
Reed v. Mann, 237 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Ga. 1964)"; Damon v. Lauderdale
County Election Comm'n, XII NAT'L MuNiciPAL LEAGUE, COURT DEcisioNs ON LEGISLATIV APPORTIONMENT 139 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (election
commission); Lucas v. Adams, XIII NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT
DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIvE APPORTIONMENT 14 (M.D. Fla. 1963), aff'd per

curiam, 378 U.S. 555 (1964); Bianchi v. Griffing, 217 F. Supp. 166 (E.D.
N.Y. 1963), 238 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal-dismissed, 382 U.S. 15
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Based on this analysis many courts have struck down county districting plans that vary from the "one man, one vote"
principle.' 6 However, not all courts have accepted the newer
position. Some courts, while accepting the applicability of the
"one man, one vote" principle, have enumerated factors which
distinguish state and local apportionment standards.' 7 Other
(1965); Small v. Jay, XIII NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS ON
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 1 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1964); Henderson v.
Superior Court of Marin County, 61 Cal. 2d 885, 390 P.2d 206 (1964); People v. O'Neill, 33 Ill. 2d 184, 210 N.E.2d 526 (1965); Brouwer v. Bronkema,
XIII NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 31 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1964), aff'd, XXIV NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,
COURT DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 1 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1966);
Mauk v. Hoffman, 87 N.J. Super. 276, 209 A.2d 150 (Super. Ct. 1965);
Augostini v. Broome County Bd. of Supervisors, XXIV NAT'L MUNICIPAL
LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 53 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966), rehearing, XXIV NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS
ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); State ex rel.

Scott v. Masterson, 173 Ohio St. 402, 183 N.E.2d 376 (1962) (city council);
State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965);
Davis, The Implications of Baker v. Carr on the County Commissioners
Court of Texas, 17 BAYLOR L. REV. 41 (1965); Oden & Meek, County Reapportionment:A Rebuttal, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 15 (1966); Snyder & Pearson, Effect of Malapportionment Cases on Political Subdivisions of the
State, 39 CONN. B.J. 1 (1965); Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal
Government, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 21 (1965).
16. Deviations based on ratio between largest and smallest com-

missioner election districts:
Approved
Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Monterey, 60

Cal. 2d 751, 388 P.2d 888 (1964).

2.2-1

Seaman v. Fedourich, XXIV NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT
DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1966).

1.97-1

Butler v. Board of County Commissioners Muskogee County, 413
P.2d 552 (Okla. 1966).
1.1-1
Disapproved
Lodico v, Board of Supervisors of the County of Rockland, XXIV
NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
4.9-1
Cogliandro v. McPherson, XXIV NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT
DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 136 (E.D. Va. 1966).
5.7-1

Ellis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 234 F. Supp. 945

(D.C. Md. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965).
Hanlon v. Towey, 142 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. 1966).

2.4-1
2.76-1

Goldstein v. Rockefeller, 45 Misc. 2d 778, 257 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup.

Ct. 1965).

5.5-1

Bailey v. Jones, 139 N.W.2d 385 (S.D. 1966).
4.6-1
17. See, e.g., Davis v. Dusch, =IV NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT
DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 142 (E.D. Va. 1966); Simon
v. Lafayette Parish Police Jury, 226 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. La. 1964) (must
consider which portion of the population is more affected by factors
such as property taxes, drainage, roads, etc.); Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Monterey, 60 Cal. 2d 751, 388 P.2d 888 (1964).

19661

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

courts still employ the "abuse of discretion" test.1 8 A diminish-

ig minority of the state courts continue to argue that the county
is completely under the control of the state legislature. 19
These courts refuse to review the validity of any county districting plan until the Supreme Court specifically recognizes
that "one man, one vote" applies to local units.
The main difficulty in the cases applying the "one man, one
vote" principle to local units appears to be in translating the
constitutional principle into appropriate standards and procedures that reflect the peculiar structure and functions which differentiate local from state and federal units. The leading case

20
appears to be Ellis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
involving a city council redistricting plan, employing a very precise application of the "one man, one vote" principle by demanding virtually mathematical exactness in determining equality.
that any factors justified a variaThe court refused to recognize
21
tion between district sizes.
In the instant case, the Minnesota court, relying on Ellis,
struck down a districting plan with a 2.76 to 1 largest-smallest
district variance. The court carefully limited its holding to a
statement that the "one man, one vote" principle applies to
county government units.2 2 No mention is made of why a simi-

18. See, e.g., Butler V. Board of County Commissioners Muskogee
County, 413 P.2d 552 (Okla. 1966); cf. McCullers v. Williamson, 221 Ga.
358, 144 S.E.2d 911 (1965) (school board).
19. See, e.g., Johnson v. Genesee County, XIII NAT'L MUNICIPAL
LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 63 (E.D. Mich.

1964); Village of Port Jefferson v. Board of Supervisors of the County
of Suffolk, 44 Misc. 2d 1083, 256 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (county
not basic unit of government in New York so county reapportionment
decisions not applicable); Midland County v. Avery, 397 S.W.2d 919
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
20. 234 F. Supp. 945 (D.C. Md. 1964), aftd, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir.
1965) (ratio of 2.4-1 largest-smallest district struck down). Being an
early federal case on the question, many courts have cited Ellis as a
leading precedent. See, e.g., Bailey v. Jones, 139 N.W.2d 385 (S.D. 1966);
State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965).
21.

Ellis recognized only two methods of reapportionment:

elec-

tions at large and strict redistricting and/or strict reapportionment. In
addition, Ellis specifically rejected any plan based on registered voters,
striking down a 1.61-1 variation based on voter registration.
22. Although not argued by counsel, the opinion suggests it could
have been argued that since the legislature has the prerogative of providing for either the election or the appointment of the county board,
any voting procedure would be permissible. However, the opinion goes
on to point out that, although the court acknowledges the right of the
legislature to appoint the county board, once the legislature provides
for an election of the board, that election is governed by the applicable
constitutional principles.
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lar result could not have been reached under the statute. 23 In
addition, there is little discussion of what, if any, factors may be
considered in deviating from the "one man, one vote" standard.
Arguably, however, the numerical variation standards and
procedural modifications applied at the county level must be
different from those applied at the state level. Most counties,
unlike the city in the Ellis case, have power to deal primarily
with problems affecting only the rural section of its population.24 The division of governmental services, taxation, and
functions between the county and the metropolitan area within
the county may not be congenial to equalizing voting power
under state legislative reapportionment standards. 25
The court in Hanlon was not unmindful of the problems
that could result from its decision. The court recognized that
redistricting a county upon population alone could result in unfair domination by the metropolitan majority and submerge the
"greater interest" of the rural minority. 26 In fact, the majority
23. See note 2 supra.
A recent Attorney General opinion emphasized the confusion visited
upon the local boards by this decision. In response to Hanlon, the Mower
County Board asked the Attorney General if the disparity within its
districts required immediate reapportionment. In response, the Attorney
General stated:
The answer to your specific inquiry . . . involves several

issues of fact which may not properly be resolved in an opinion
of this office ....

[T]he obligation to make this determination

rests primarily with the Board, which must take into account
both the Hanlon case and ... Hetherington....
It may be concluded, therefore, that county boards, in determining whether they are required to redistrict, must take into
account not only the obligation to redistrict as imposed by the
statute, but also that obligation which results when existing districts have the effect of impairing "basic constitutional guarantees."
MNN. ATT'Y GEf. Op. 798-c (1966).
24. See, e.g.; iPxN. STAT. § 394.24(2) (1965). See generally Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties
and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLum. L. REV.21 (1965).
25. Moreover, in view of the differences between county and
state governments, there are additional considerations applicable
to county districting which can justify a departure from equality
of population. County governments perform a number of important functions for unincorporated areas which are ordinarily
performed entirely or in large part by city governments in incorporated areas. Among these functions are police and fire
protection, park and recreation services, street construction and
maintenance, and the adoption and enforcement of local police
measures such as those concerning sanitation, zoning, and the
licensing of businesses.
Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Monterey, 60 Cal. 2d
751, 756, 388 P.2d 888, 891 (1964).
(Emphasis added.)
26. 142 N.W.2d at 747.
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opinion offered a suggested solution to this problem:
Conceivably, in exercising those powers which necessarily may
affect the interest of some residents more than others, a unanimous or four-fifths vote of the county board may justifiably be
running afoul of federal constitutional rerequired without
27
quirements.
This is, indeed, a disturbing suggestion. From a practical
point of view, it would be difficult to determine which actions
would require a four-fifths or unanimous vote. Unless situations
calling for this procedure were carefully enumerated by the legislature, each action taken by the county board would involve a
conflict between rural and metropolitan representatives as to
whether a unanimous or four-fifths vote was needed. Constitutionally, it is difficult to believe that such a procedure would
be acceptable. Although the districts would be equally apportioned, such a voting procedure would, in effect, vest a veto
power in the hands of a minority rural interest. 2s Thirtyeight per cent of the population electing three out of five commissioners does not seem significantly different from thirty-eight
per cent of the population electing two out of five commissioners
with a veto over any decisions adopted by the majority. This
system could result in just as great a dilution of voting power
as the present system. In fact, such a system could result in an
even greater dilution since, under the present system, all three
rural commissioners must act in concert to accomplish their objective. Under the court's proposal, one commissioner, representing an even smaller minority, could frustrate the majority position. Although the plan would be true to the "one man, one
vote" principle in terms of population variance, it would defeat
27. Id. at 747 n.19. (Emphasis added.)
28. Under the present system, the smallest number of voters that
can elect a majority of the board is:
8,708
Third District
9,230
Fourth District
6,931
Fifth District
24,869
If the districts were all equal in population, 13,107 voters would reside
in each district. Under a unanimous voting procedure, 13,107 could elect
a commissioner capable of vetoing board actions. Under a four-fifths
procedure 26,214 voters would be able to frustrate the majority. Although this latter figure is a slight numerical improvement over the
present divisions, this improvement is not significant and certainly still
constitutionally objectionable. The plan suggested by the court would
mean that the rural representatives could no longer impose their will
on the commissioners representing the metropolitan area. However,
with the presence of a veto power, this change would seem to have little
or no constitutional significance.
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the very purpose for which such a plan was conceived. 2
A recent case involving reapportionment of a city council
demonstrates another technique which attempts to establish
equality of voting power while maintaining a voice in the rural
minority.80 Approving a plan providing for eleven councilmen
to be elected at large, four from the city as a whole and one from
each of seven boroughs, the court stated that:
The principal and adequate reason for providing for the election of one councilman from each borough is to assure that there
will be members of the City Council with some general knowledge of rural problems to the end that this heterogeneous city
will be able to give due consideration to questions presented
throughout the entire area ....
[T]he history-past and present-of the area and population now comprising the City of Virginia Beach demonstrates
the compelling need, at least during an appreciable transition
1
period, for knowledge of rural problems ....

However, such a plan is of dubious value. Assuming each
district to be unequally populated, as would necessarily be the
case in a county such as Olmsted, the nomination of candidates
by each district could be constitutionally objectionable. In
addition, the final decision as to which nominee to elect still

would be completely in the hands of the metropolitan voters.
Essentially, the push for county reapportionment points up
the even larger difficulties in the county government system.
Malapportionment, in this instance, is merely indicative of the
need for wholesale examination of governmental structure on
the local level so as to make that structure more reflective of
the wants and needs of a vastly changing population. 32 The
need for consolidation of the county-city functions combined
with the increasing federal-county and state-county relationships
29. In counties like Olmsted, an at large election system without
procedural modifications could completely submerge the voice of the
rural minority. Sixty-two per cent of the population divided into five
districts would put over twelve per cent in each district. Thirty-eight
per cent divided into five districts would put over seven per cent in
each district. Conceivably, the city majority could elect all five commissioners.
30. Davis v. Dusch, XXIV NAT'L MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DEcISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 142 (E.D. Va. 1966).
31. Id. at 147. The holding is based on Reed v. Mann, 237 F. Supp.
22 (N.D. Ga. 1964) (commissioners may be required to reside in districts, although elected at large).
32. See generally U.S. ADvIsoRY COMn'N ON INTEGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES To GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION
IN METROPOLITAN AREAS (1962); U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND
PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS (1961).
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results in the county, or a modification of it, evolving as an
important unit of local government. 33 The county government
unit is not now equipped to play such an important role.
The county in most states is thoroughly strait-jacketed by constitutional provisions. County officers are characteristically
named in the constitution, county boundaries have constitutional protections, relatively few states permit a free choice of
optional forms of county government and fewer permit the
adoption of locally drawn "home rule" charters. The county
continues to be considered primarily in its traditional role as
an instrumentality of the state even though in urban areas it
increasingly assumes the responsibility for providing municipal-type services. Structural changes in county government are
important as significant demonstrations of efforts to require
a different job in a different governmental
counties to 3do
environment. 4
The preceding comments are not intended to dispute the
validity or necessity of bringing county commissioner election
districts within the requirements of the equal protection clause.
No attempt is made to argue that the county is an administrative
unit and thus outside of the "elected legislative body" test suggested by Reynolds.35 Nor is it contended that, because the Supreme Court has not applied the principle to local governments,
the application is bad. These comments are intended to argue
for a workable transitional program for applying the "one man,
one vote" principle to county governments in Minnesota. Implicit in this argument is the need for providing the county
boards with the tools for effecting proper reapportionment as
part of an overall reorganization of the county-city relationship.
From the court, this demands a formulation of constitutional
standards that reflect the peculiar nature of the county governmental unit. From the legislature, it demands statutory changes
to allow the county board to integrate, consolidate, and streamline its functioning to meet the demands of the growing metropolitan areas.36 Finally, from the county boards, it demands a
33. See Weinstein, The Effect of the FederalReapportionment Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLuM.
L. REv. 21 (1965).
34. Cassella, Metropolitan Government, II CONSTrUTIONAL AsPECTS
oF STATE-LOcAL RELATioNSHsPS 4, Citizens Research Council of Michigan
(1961) cited in 1962 ADVIsoRY Comm'N REPORT, op. cit. supra note 32, at
41. In this connection, it must be noted that reapportionment and
reorganization are inseparable. Reapportionment, by itself, will not
equip the county government to capably answer the needs of its diverse
population.
35. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
36. In order to meet new functional demands, legislation must be
enacted to authorize counties and municipalities to take mutual and
co-ordinated actions to consolidate the present duplication of power and
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co-ordination of proper reapportionment and suitable reorganization measures so as to reach a balance between the demands
of the rural minority and the increasing metropolitan majority.

Constitutional Law: Implied Consent To Search
and Seizure in Home of Accused
After identifying the accused's wife as the victim of a brutal
murder, police entered the accused's home-the scene of the
crime-and without a warrant made an immediate search of the
premises. A second search occurred approximately one hour after the police initially entered the house. During this more
thorough search, the police removed certain items which led to
apprehension of the killer and corroboration of his testimony,
which was a major portion of the prosecution's evidence against
the accused. The accused appealed his conviction of first degree
murder, posing as error, inter alia, that evidence procured from
the second search of the scene of the crime should have been
suppressed as the product of an unlawful search and seizure.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and held
the challenged evidence admissible as the product of a lawful
search and seizure. State v. Thompson, 139 N.W.2d 490 (Minn.
1966).
2
In the leading cases of Mapp v. Ohio' and Ker v. California,
the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary
rules of evidence applicable in federal criminal prosecution involving illegal searches and seizures also apply to state prosecutions, and that the "reasonableness" of searches and seizures
conducted by state authorities is to be decided according to federal constitutional standards.3 Thus evidence obtained from the
search of an accused's dwelling without a warrant is generally
inadmissible unless incident to a lawful arrest. 4 An exception to
services. Such legislation may, indeed, include optional county charter
and county government home rule and even county-city consolidation.
See ADvisoRY Comm'N REPORTS, op. cit. supra note 32. See also Grubbs,
Legal Aspects of City-County Consolidation in Tennessee, 30 TENN. L.
REv. 499 (1963).

1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949).
2. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).

3. The majority held that federal constitutional standards are to
be applied injudging admissibility of evidence instate actions. Id. at 33.
4. See Carroll v.United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Johnson v.
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this rule is the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine under which
police may make an immediate search of the premises to prevent
destruction of evidence or to protect life.5 Further, constitutional protection against unreasonable searches may be waived
7
by consent to a search 6 or by an invitation to conduct a search.
The Supreme Court, however, has not spoken directly to the
questions of what is an "unreasonable" search in the Mapp-Ker
context or what constitutes consent to a search.
Although in most cases consent to search is given prior to or
contemporaneously with a search, a California decision held that
consent, given after a search was conducted, ratified and legalized the search. 8 Consent must be positively established9 and
must be unequivocal and specific. 10 In some jurisdictions immunity is not waived by one who neither objects nor consents
to a search," since a citizen is not required to perform any
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (dictum); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) (dictum).
5. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42 (1963); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis.
2d 284, 124 N.W.2d 47 (1963).
6. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Campbell
v. United States, 151 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1945); United States v. Shules,
65 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1933); DeLapp v. United States, 53 F.2d 627 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 684 (1931).
7. See United States v. Thomson, 113 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940);

Milyonico v. United States, 53 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286
U.S. 551 (1932); Gant v. State, 114 Fla. 23, 152 So. 710 (1934).
In City of St. Paul v. Stovall, 225 Minn. 309, 30 N.W.2d 638 (1948),

the court sustained a search of the home of an accused after he had invited and made no attempt to stop a search by officers who had disclosed the nature of the complaint.
8. People v. Allen, 298 P.2d 714 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956). But
see Hamel v. State, 317 P.2d 285 (Okla. Crim. 1957), where officers
without a warrant peered through the transom of a hotel room and

saw contraband lying on the bed. They then requested the accused, a
hotel clerk, to open the door, saying he need not do so and that they
would post a guard and obtain a warrant ifhe refused. The court held
that his acquiescence was not consent and the search, which was illegal
from the beginning, could not be ratified even by a valid consent. In
dictum the court said that once the officers had peered into the room,
even a valid warrant obtained later would not render the evidence admissible.
9. See United States v. Lydecker, 275 Fed. 976 (W.D.N.Y. 1921).
10. Karwicki v.United States, 55 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1932). See also
Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1965), which notes that courts will often
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and will not "presume acquiescence."
11. See Duffy v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Adams v.State, 202 Miss. 68, 76, 30 So. 2d 593, 596-97 (1947); Lancaster
v. State, 188 Miss. 374, 195 So. 320 (1940); Boyd v. State, 164 Miss. 610,
145 So. 618 (1933).
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affirmative act to retain his constitutional protections. 12 Thus
peaceful submission to a search is neither consent nor an invitation, 3 but is merely a demonstration of willingness to submit
4
to the inherent authority of the law.'

Although Minnesota adheres to the general rule that a search
of a house without a warrant is illegal unless incident to a lawful arrest, 1 5 the standards employed to determine the validity
of waivers of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures are not clear. 16 The Minnesota court upheld a search of the accused's automobile arising from what
12. Dade v. State, 188 Okla. 677, 112 P.2d 1102 (1941); State v.
Warfield, 184 Wis. 56, 198 N.W. 854 (1924).
13. See United States v. Pollack, 64 F. Supp. 554 (D.N.J. 1946).
In United States v. Sully, 56 F. Supp. 942, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), the court
stated: "[W]aiver must be by the defendant himself and also purely
Acquiescence in the search, without clear
voluntary on his part ....
consent, or mere submission in an orderly way to the actions of the
federal agents, is not a waiver."
Bull v. Armstrong, 254 Ala. 390, 48 So. 2d 467 (1950), held that, where
one permits a search of his premises under an apparently valid search
warrant, his permission is not construed as a freely given invitation to
search.
14. United States v. Hoffenberg, 24 F. Supp. 989 (E.D.N.Y. 1938);
United States v. Slusser, 270 Fed. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1921); Meno v. State,
197 Ind. 16, 148 N.E. 420 (1925); Graham v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 9, 184
P.2d 984 (1947); Dade v. State, 188 Okla. 677, 679, 112 P.2d 1102, 1104
(1941).
In State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W.2d 327, cert. denied, 375
U.S. 867 (1963), the Minnesota court said it was a question of fact
whether the accused had consented to a search rather than merely having submitted to police authority. Accord, Blackburn v. State, 145 Tex.
Crim. 384, 168 S.W.2d 662 (1943).
15. DUNNELL, MINNESOTA DIGEST Searches & Seizures § 8708a, citing
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). No Minnesota Supreme
Court cases are there cited, and none have been found; but two cases
employing this rule have arisen in the Minnesota federal district court.
Wida v. United States, 52 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1931); Kroska v. United
States, 51 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1931).
16. The situation is no better in the area of standards for determining reasonableness of searches and seizures. "[TIhe issue of reasonableness of a search and seizure is one of fact and depends upon the particular circumstances of each case." State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405,
411, 136 N.W.2d 577, 582 (1965). And in State v. Sorenson, 270 Minn.
186, 134 N.W.2d 115 (1965), the court merely recognized that the fourth
amendment does not condemn all searchers, but only those which are
unreasonable. No specific guidelines, however, were advanced by either
decision. The court had offered little assistance in its earlier decision
of State v. Ryan, 156 Minn. 186, 194 N.W. 396 (1923), wherein it was
stated that whether searches and seizures are unreasonable depends upon
the character of the articles procured and circumstances under which
they are obtained. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950);
State v. Gebhard, 272 Minn. 336, 137 N.W.2d 168 (1965).
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police considered to be suspicious behavior where the accused
had not objected to the search. The burden of proving lack of
consent was placed upon the defendant who had not denied that
17
he consented to a search and did not claim duress or coercion.
In a decision rendered shortly thereafter, however, the court
stated: "It is, of course, true that the consent must be freely
given without any coercion or threats and that any claim of
waiver of constitutional rights must be viewed with caution."' s
This latter expression implies that consent must be affirmatively
expressed and that the burden of proving a waiver is to be
cast upon the party claiming consent.
In the instant case, the court overtly based its holding upon
the accused's authorization of the second search,19 relying primarily upon his generally cooperative attitude and his failure to
object to that search.20 However, reasonableness of the search
may have been a second, though implicit, ground for the decision.
Since several passages of the opinion emphasized the needs of the
investigative process, 21 the court was perhaps motivated at least
in part by the difficulties an opposite conclusion would have
17. State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W.2d 327, cert. denied, 375
U.S. 867 (1963). The court in the instant case properly distinguished
Harris as dealing with search of an automobile on the basis of the traditional distinction between searches of homes and searches of moveable
objects. 139 N.W.2d at 508. An automobile can be removed from the
jurisdiction during the time necessary to procure a warrant; a building
cannot. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). The distinction, however, is
open to criticism for its failure to account for the opportunity of the
occupant of a building to destroy vital evidence before the police are
able to procure a warrant.
For a contrary view on the burden of proof to show presence or
lack of consent, see People v. Kaigler, 368 Mich. 281, 294, 118 N.W.2d 406,
413 (1962) (requiring the prosecution to present "clear and positive
testimony").
18. State ex rel. Branchaud v. Hedman, 269 Minn. 375, 380, 130
N.W.2d 628, 631 (1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 907 (1965).
19. "We think the evidence here sufficiently shows authorization
of the search by the one entitled to object to it so that it cannot be said
that the search and seizure were unreasonable." 139 N.W.2d at 507.
20. While at the hospital to which his wife had been taken, the
accused, during a conversation with the detective in charge of the investigation, said that robbery might have been the motive for the attack
on his wife and suggested that police search the basement of his home
for a large sum of money he said was kept there. 139 N.W.2d at 500.
In its discussion of search and seizure, however, the court did not mention the accused's suggestion that the police search his home. Further,
when informed of the searches of his home, the accused voiced no objection, but "on the contrary showed every indication of his desire to
assist in the apprehension of the perpetrator of the crime." Id. at 504.
21. Id. at 506-08.
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imposed upon the investigation of crime.22 Thus the opinion
argued that to require a warrant in a case such as this might
23
prove an impossible impediment to the solution of crime.
Finally, it is possible that the court was influenced by the accused's experience as a criminal lawyer 24 for it is a fair inference that he was entirely aware of his constitutional rights.
The court ignored the fact that the accused's "consent" was
given after the search was begun.25 The opinion implied that,
since the accused initially assumed the role of bereaved husband
by cooperating with the investigation, he would have had to
consent to the search had the police requested it; therefore his
consent may be presumed. Thus it appears the court implicitly
ruled that a consent given after initiation or even after completion of a search ratifies the search, without analyzing the implications of such a determination. However, if peaceful submission to a search upon request denotes merely a willingness to
22. The police officers ought to be given an opportunity. to
investigate a crime; and where the occupant of the premises
permits a search . . . he should not thereafter be permitted to
claim that objects found . . . should be suppressed as the pro-

duct of an unlawful search and seizure. Permitting the officers to make a search without a warrant at a time when the
ocupant of the premises is not even suspected of the crime
lulls them into security. Thereafter excluding the objects
obtained ...

is obviously unfair....

139 N.W.2d at 508.
Taking charge of the building in which a serious crime has been
committed until an exhaustive search can be completed, as was done in
the instant case, is apparently standard police practice in St. Paul. Telephone conversation with Ramsey Cotmty Attorney, October 11, 1966;
memo on file at the Minnesota Law Review. Of course, in most cases
the owner of a home in which such a crime has occurred would have no
objection to turning it over for a thorough examination.
For a helpful discussion of the permissible scope of an on-the-scene
investigation, see State v. Rees, 139 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa 1966). See also
Wilson v. State, 217 N.E.2d 147 (]nd. 1966).
23. 139 N.W.2d at 506. Following the language of the fourth
amendment, TNN. STAT. § 626.08 (1965) 'requires the property to be
seized to be particularly described if a warrant is to be obtained. Since
at the time of the search in the instant case, the officers did not know
what items would be seized, under a strict interpretation of the statute
they probably could not have obtained a warrant. The court emphasized
that the search in question was crucial to discovery of the perpetrators
of the crime. 139 N.W.2d at 506-07. Thus it is reasonable to infer that
if a warrant is a precondition to a constitutional search and a warrant
could not have been procured, the guilty party or parties might never
have been found.
24. Again, no reference to this factor was made in the discussion
of search and seizure. Its only mention was in the statement of the case
at the beginning of the opinion. 139 N.W.2d at 495.
25. Id. at 508.
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bow to apparent legal authority rather than consent, 26 peaceful
acquiescence to a search already in progress certainly cannot denote more. If anything, coercion of the accused would be more
severe in the latter case, since he would be required to take affirmative steps-protests to the police search party-or his con2
stitutional rights would be waived. 7
Unfortunately, a rationale of "consent" to validate searches
in the absence of a warrant 28 appears to be an inadequate vehicle for deciding the constitutionality of a search and seizure
in view of the competing interests involved: solution of crime
and preservation of an individual's right to privacy and security
in his person, house, papers and effects. If the question of
whether consent has been "freely given"29 is to be determined
with fairness to the rights of the accused, the circumstances of
each case should receive consideration in preference to excessive
reliance upon automatic indices of consent. Investigating officers and often the courts would therefore be confronted with a
number of intertwined, intricate questions which probe the hidden depths of the thoughts and emotions of the persons from
whom consent to search must be obtained.30 The police would
therefore be confronted with a dilemma: if their request to
search is denied, search is precluded; but even if an apparent
consent is given, evidence obtained from the search may be inadmissible if a court disagrees with the determination of the
police that consent was "freely" given. Thus, depending upon
how it is applied, a consent rationale would either sacrifice the
interests of the individual to the use of rigid rules or cause
searches to be a hazardous technique because of uncertainty as
to their legality. And if the rationale were not applied consistently, neither interest would adequately be served.
It would appear the competing interests could better be accommodated by employing a rationale of reasonableness. Since
an immediate search of the scene of a crime may be crucial to
26. See note 13 supra, and accompanying text.
27. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
28. See note 23 supra.
29. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
30. The following are indicative of the questions which should be
posed in considering the total circumstances underlying an alleged "consent": whether the person from whom "consent" was allegedly obtained
was emotionally capable of giving an affirmative consent of his own free
will; if so, whether that person was aware of and understood his constitutional right to object to the search; and if so, whether any actions of
the police, even their request to conduct the search, operated in any way
to coerce that individual into consenting to the search.
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its solution, to require a warrant in all such cases would unduly
impede the investigative function. 31 A search without a warrant
or consent which is limited to the "scene" of a violent crime
should be considered reasonable if conducted immediately after
commission of the crime.3 2 The police could then conduct a
search with the confidence that, within fairly well defined limitations of time and area, legality of the search and admissibility
of evidence obtained therefrom would not be open to question.
In this context, there should be a distinct preference for society's interest in solving crimes as against the individual's interest in noninterference with his privacy. This choice between
values is warranted in view of the serious threats such criminal
conduct poses to the security of society.
However, subject to established exceptions other than consent, the interest of the individual should be protected by requiring the police to obtain warrants to conduct searches in all
other cases. Although the police are equally hampered by a
requirement to secure warrants to search scenes of nonviolent
crimes, such crimes do not pose as serious a threat to society as
do crimes of violence. And society's interest would not appear
to outweigh the interest of the individual under these circumstances.
The instant case may stand for the proposition that whenever
one "consents" to a search of his property, whether before or
after the fact, the fruits of that search are admissible in evidence against him. At the very least, the decision will require
a citizen to object immediately upon discovering the police in
the process of searching his home, or risk that any evidence
discovered in the search may be used against him due to his
"consent" to the search. Nothing would seem more contrary to
the spirit of the fourth amendment or less in keeping with the
holdings of Mapp and Ker. Thus, whatever is thought of the
result of the instant case, the rationale leading to it is unsatisfactory, and the implications of the court's language are unduly
31. See note 22 supra.
32. This presumption should be applied to a general search of the
entire premises. Contra, State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 310, 124 N.W.2d 47
(1963), rev'd on other grounds, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964).
The court there upheld admission of evidence obtained in the room in
which the body of the victim was found, but evidence found in another
room was excluded because it was the product of a general search which
was illegal in the absence of a warrant. This view would appear unduly
restrictive, however, in view of the difficulty of obtaining a warrant in
cases in which investigating officers cannot specify precisely what items
they seek.
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broad. Instead of relying on the consent theory, the court would
have been on firmer ground had it chosen to rely upon the reasonableness of the search as part of an immediate investigation
of the scene of a crime of violence. This approach would have
sustained the search in the instant case, while leaving ample
room for police investigative processes, but without creating the
potential dangers inherent in the approach used.

Criminal Law: Habeas Corpus Available Even Though
Petitioner May Not Be Entitled to Immediate
Release From Prison
Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of ten
to eighty years on his plea of guilty to the crime of first-degree
robbery. The usual five to forty year sentence for first-degree
robbery was doubled because of a prior felony conviction.' Subsequent to the expiration of the appeal period, petitioner sought
a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the prior conviction was obtained in violation of his federal constitutional right to counsel.
The lower court denied the petition holding it premature since
Holm had not yet served the maximum sentence for the underlying offense. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court found
the petition not premature and held that habeas corpus was
available to provide the convicted prisoner with a hearing to
determine the alleged denial of his federal constitutional rights.
State ex rel. Holm v. Tahash, 139 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. 1966).
The historical function of the writ of habeas corpus was to
obtain the speedy and immediate release of those illegally imprisoned. 2 From this premise the Minnesota court developed
the prematurity doctrine,3 requiring a prisoner to serve the maximum 4 time of the valid indeterminate sentence before a habeas
1. See Minnesota's habitual criminal statute, M.ni.
(1965).
2.

STAT. § 609.155

See State ex rel. Basset v. Tahash, 263 Minn. 447, 116 N.W.2d

564 (1962); Wojahn v. Halter, 229 Minn. 374, 39 N.W.2d 545 (1949); State
ex rel. Bales v. Bailey, 106 Minn. 138, 118 N.W. 676 (1908).
3. State ex rel. Carmody v. Reed, 132 Minn. 295, 156 N.W. 127
(1916), appears to be the origin of the prematurity concept in Minnesota.
4. There was at one time some question whether the prematurity
doctrine required the petitioner to serve the maximum or minimum
sentence. See State ex rel. Adams v. Rigg, 252 Minn. 283, 89 N.W.2d
898 (1958); State ex rel. Richter v. Swenson, 241 Minn. 414, 63 N.W.2d
265, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 979 (1954). In State ex rel. Flynn v. Rigg,
256 Minn. 304, 312, 98 N.W.2d 79, 85-86 (1959), this ambiguity was rather
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corpus hearing on a challenged prior conviction could be
granted.5 For example, in the instant case the prematurity
rule would deny the habeas corpus remedy to the petitioner until he had served forty years of his sentence because, if the prior
conviction had not been considered, petitioner could have been
given a maximum sentence of forty years for the crime of which
he was convicted.
The court suggested several reasons the instant petition
should not be held premature. If the claim is proven, the
case will be remanded for re-sentencing the petitioner. On such
remand the maximum sentence imposed may be less than forty
years. Since petitioner has served ten years, he may have already served beyond the time he would receive in re-sentencing.
It was further reasoned that failure to relieve petitioner
from his present sentence may adversely affect his parole opportunities by causing the parole authority to grant hearings to
petitioner less frequently.6 In Minnesota, every inmate appears
at a parole hearing at least once every three years, and hearings
may be granted at shorter intervals in the discretion of the parole authority.7 While such discretionary hearings are usually
granted primarily on the basis of an evaluation of the prisoner's
behavior and the nature of his crime, the policy of the parole
authority to base its determinations upon the totality of the
prisoner's record would seem to demand that a prior conviction
also be considered. Certainly the fact that the sentence presently being served was increased because of a prior conviction
would have some affect upon the decision to grant or deny
parole. It is notable that Holm was paroled immediately after
the decision in the instant case.8
artificially resolved: "[H] e must have served as a minimum the maximum term of the sentence which is free from objection ....

"

5. State ex rel. Nelson v. Tahash, 265 Minn. 330, 121 N.W.2d 584
(1963); State ex rel. Flynn v. Rigg, supra note 4.
The prematurity rule is also allied with the concept of mootness.
If the petitioner is not entitled to immediate release even if he proves
his claim, the case is moot. Any judicial inquiry would be advisory and
therefore beyond the case or controversy scope of Art. III § 2 of the
United States Constitution. See 46 B.U.L. REV. 269, 271 (1966).
6. This argument demands that a hearing be available at any time
subsequent to the expiration of the time for appeal from the conviction.
In Minnesota any prisoner, not serving a life sentence, may be released
by the parole authority at any time. ]AinNN. STAT. § 609.12 (1965).
7. Ibid.
8. On February 28, 1966, the district court noted that Holm had
been paroled and accepted Lappegard, Commissioner of Corrections of
the State of Minnesota, as a substitute for respondent Tahash. The
court heard Holm's claims and found that he had been denied the right to
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The court also found support for its decision in the evidentiary advantage of an early hearing. If Holm were required to
serve forty years before he could obtain a hearing, crucial
witnesses would be dead or their recollection dulled by the
passage of time, and most records relating to the issues raised
by the petition would be lost or destroyed. 9 The testimony of
the petitioner may be the only evidence then available. The unavailability of evidence could make the burden resting upon the
state to establish the validity of the prior conviction difficult
or impossible to sustain.
However, the predominant concern reflected by the Holm
decision is the desire to preserve state authority over criminal
matters. 10 The court noted the broad scope of post-conviction
procedures in the federal courts and found that federal courts
often grant hearings in situations falling within the strict application of the prematurity concept." Thus, by eliminating the
prematurity rule, Holm makes another step in the line of Minnesota cases extending the writ of habeas corpus to meet the broad2
ening of the remedy in federal courts.1
Consistency between state and federal post-conviction procounsel in Nevada and his sentence was reduced to five to forty years.

State ex rel. Holm v. Lappegard, 10th Jud. Dist., File 34342 (1966).
9. The court pointed out that Minnesota records are commonly
required to be kept only ten years. See MINI. STAT. §§ 46.21, 384.14,
485.23 (1965). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Meyers, 419
Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613 (1965); State v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d
753 (1965); 4 DUQUESNE L. REV. 468 (1966); 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 719
(1966).
10. Above all, refusing to make available an adequate remedy
by broadening our procedures when it is within our power to do
so could be regarded as an abdication of our primary responsibility for the administration of criminal justice by the courts of
this state.
139 N.W.2d at 164.
11. See, e.g., Martin v. Commonwealth, 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965);
United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964); United States ex rel. LaNear v. LaVallee, 306
F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Smith v. Jackson, 234 F.2d

742 (2d Cir. 1956); Foreman v. Fay, 184 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
But see United States ex rel. Brown v. Warden, 231 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.
N.Y. 1964).
12. Prior to Holm, habeas corpus in Minnesota was used to review
allegations of cruel and unusual treatment and illegal search and seizure.
See State ex rel. Cole v. Tahash, 269 Minn. 1, 129 N.W.2d 903 (1964)
(cruel and unusual treatment); State ex rel. Branchaud v. Hedman, 269
Minn. 375, 130 N.W.2d 628 (1964) (illegal search and seizure). Subsequent to Holm, State ex rel. Atkinson v. Tahash, 142 N.W.2d 294 (Minn.
1966), held that habeas corpus is a proper remedy for a petitioner on

parole. See also Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
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cedures serves both state and federal interests. 13 Such harmony
allows the states to retain a greater control over the administration of their criminal laws and will tend to avoid the conflict
between local and national power arising from assertions of federal constitutional rights. ft may also reduce relitigation of
identical factual issues. 14 Further, consideration of a larger
number of post-conviction petitions by the state courts will
substantially relieve the
onerous work load now falling on the
5
federal court system.
However, a judicial expansion of post-conviction procedures
is not without disadvantage. By freeing the common law writs
from their traditional restrictions, the distinctions between the
several historical remedies tend to become vague and indefinite.
The scope of available procedures may become broader than is
necessary to adequately protect the rights of the petitioner. It
was probably for these reasons that the Holm court urged a legislative enactment governing post-conviction relief.16 A statutory solution could provide a single procedure to replace present
indefinite and multitudinous post-conviction remedies. Such a
statute could fully protect federal constitutional rights, eliminate
procedural complexities, and limit the burden of the state courts
7
to those cases demanding relief.'
These purposes could be accomplished either by federal legislation 8 or by a state statute providing a post-conviction procedure. 19 While the need for identity of state and federal procedures would probably be better served by a federal enactment, a state statute would have the advantage of continuing
the separate spheres of state and federal government.

13. See Report of the Special Committee on Habeas Corpus to the
Conference of Chief Justices, Appendix (1953).
14. See Desmond, Federal and State Habeas Corpus: How to Make
Two ParallelJudicial Lines Meet, 49 A.B.A.J. 1166, 1167 (1963).
15. See Ibid.; Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional
Right or Legislative Grace, 40 CALiF. L. REV. 335 (1952); Meador, Ac-

commodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Post-conviction
Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928 (1964); cf. Note, 52 VA. L. REV. 486 (1966).
16. The court prefaced its holding: "[P] ending enactment of a postconviction procedure statute which will meet constitutional requirements, habeas corpus is available .... ." 139 N.W.2d at 164.
17. See 9B UNIFoRm LAws ANNOTATED 541 (Prefactory Note 1966).
18. See Desmond, supra note 14, at 1168.
19. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1, -7 (1965) MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §§ 645-A, -J (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217, -222
(1965) ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 138.510, .680 (1963).
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Criminal Law: Increased Liberality in Admitting
Evidence of Other Sexual Offenses Conditioned

on Prior Disclosure by Prosecution
During trial of the accused for indecent assault' the prosecution was permitted to elicit testimony that the accused had
engaged in dissimilar criminal sexual conduct with the prosecutrix and others. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that such
evidence, although establishing commission of an offense of a
different type from that charged, was sufficiently similar to be
admissible. However, the court reversed the conviction, holding
that in this and all future cases 2 the accused must be forewarned of those additional criminal offenses the prosecution intends to raise at trial.3 State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.
2d 167 (1966).
The question of admissibility of other offenses 4 into evidence illustrates the much discussed problem of balancing the
right of an accused to a fair trial against the interest of society
in preventing and punishing criminal conduct. If evidence of
all other criminal conduct by an accused were admissible, he
would probably be seriously prejudiced. A tendency to convict
may arise, based not upon proven guilt of the crime charged,
but upon a belief the accused has committed other unpunished
crimes for which he should be incarcerated, regardless of his
present guilt." Furthermore, the jury may infer that because the

1. MInr.

STAT.

§ 617.08 (1965).

2. The rule of Spreigi is to be applied prospectively.

272 Minn.

488, 496, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173 (1966). All cases prosecuted to final judgment before the decision remain unaffected. See, e.g., State v. Klotter,
142 N.W.2d 568 (Minn. 1966); State v. Drews, 144 N.W.2d 251 (Minn.
1966). Such a rule is contrary to current sentiment. See Currier, Time
and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV.
201, 266-72 (1965). Cf. Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling
ConstitutionalDecision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650, 680 (1962);
Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 942 (1962).
3. This novel approach had previously arisen only in a single
dictum. See State v. Jensen, 70 Ore. 156, 140 Pac. 740 (1914). Offenses
within the immediate episode of the crime charged, offenses for which
the accused has been previously prosecuted, and offenses which are
introduced to rebut the accused's evidence of good character, however,
are exempt from such disclosure. 272 Minn. at 497, 139 N.W.2d at 173.
4. Offenses, which are allegations for which an accused has not
been penalized, should be distinguished from convictions, which are
findings of guilt by courts of law for which punishment is imposed.
5. See Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion
as Evidence in Prosecutionsfor Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIz. L. REv. 212, 218
(1965); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5
VAND. L. REV. 385, 409 (1952); Note, 37 MnNx. L. Ruv. 608, 609 (1953).
6. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENC E § 57 (3d ed. 1940).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:306

accused committed additional crimes, he also committed the
crime for which he is being tried.7 This prejudicial effect is
even more alarming considering the degree of proof necessary to
infer commission of other offenses. Although guilt of the crime
charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence establishing other crimes need not be so conclusive." Therefore,
the accused might be convicted of the crime charged because of
his involvement in other crimes, notwithstanding a reasonable
doubt as to his participation in those crimes." The accused is
also disadvantaged because of surprise ° and confusion arising
from a mass of collateral issues." The prosecution, on the other
hand, often must rely upon evidence of the accused's other criminal activities if guilt of the crime in issue is to be established.
Thus highly probative evidence which incidentally established
the accused's participation in other crimes may well be of critical
importance to the prosecution's case.' 2
Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, most courts
balanced these competing interests by admitting evidence tending to establish additional criminal conduct of the accused, necessary to the prosecution's case, if it was relevant to issues other
than the accused's propensity toward criminal conduct, and did
not create an unreasonable potential for bias.'3 This inclusionary rule advanced the interests both of society and the accused.
Additional criminal activity of an accused could be used to establish necessary elements of guilt, but such evidence could not
be used solely for the prejudicial purpose of illustrating criminal
propensities.
The inclusionary rule, however, has been replaced 14 in most
7. See Note, 70

YALE L.J. 763-64 (1961).
8. People v. Rosoto, 58 Cal. 2d 304, 331, 373 P.2d 867, 879, cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 955 (1963); State v. Roberts, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 443, 131

N.E.2d 665, 669 (Ct. App. 1955).
9. Since the decision in Spreigl, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
indicated a willingness to accept almost any evidence of criminal conduct. See State v. Drews, 144 N.W.2d 251, 255-56 (Minn. 1966).
10. 1 WHARToN, CRnvinNAL EVIDENCE § 233 (12th ed. 1955).
11. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 29a (3d ed. 1940).
12. For an excellent example of the need of such evidence see
United States v. Lindsay, 227 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1008 (1956).

13.

See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence:

America, 51 HARv. L. REV. 988, 1004 (1938); Stone, The Rule of Exclusion
of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARv. L. REV. 954, 965-66 (1933);
Trautman, supra note 5, at 409; Note, '70 YALE L.J. 763, 769 (1961).
14. For the reasons behind this change, see Stone, The Rule of
Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARv. L. REV. 988, 1035
(1938).
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jurisdictions 15 by an exclusionary rule, under which, unless specifically excepted,16 evidence of participation in crimes other
than that charged is inadmissible. Although both rules are addressed to the same purpose, the exclusionary rule approach
leads to significant disadvantages for both the prosecution and
the accused. Because courts tend to consider the rule and its
exceptions as a predetermined index of relevancy, 17 rulings
concerning admissibility of evidence of additional offenses are
based upon an automatic categorization rather than upon consideration of the special circumstances in-specific cases.1 8 The
results are that highly probative and relevant evidence is often inadmissible because not within an exception to the rule,
whereas irrelevant and prejudicial evidence to which an exception applies is often admitted.' 9 The policy behind the exclusionary rule is therefore frustrated, since evidence relevant only
to prove the accused's propensity to commit crime is brought
before the trier of fact. Some commentators argue the rule can
nevertheless operate successfully if its exceptions are discreetly
test illuapplied.2 0 Most, however, believing such a pragmatic
22
sory, 21 recommend returning to the inclusionary rule.
Because Minnesota follows the exclusionary rule,23 evidence
24
of other offenses has been admitted to prove facts not in issue,
and rarely has the prejudice to the accused been balanced
25
against the necessity of such evidence to the prosecution's -case.
15. The inclusionary rule is now in force only in federal courts and
a small but growing minority of state courts. Note, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 767
(1961).
16. The list of exceptions varies among jurisdictions, but evidence
is normally admitted to show: (1) res gestae; (2) common scheme or
plan; (3) unusual and distinctive method; (4) identity; (5) passion for

illicit sexual relations with the accuser; (6) scienter; (7)- motive; (8)
specific intent; or (9) purpose to avoid punishment. -Note, 70 YALE L.J.
763, 767 (1961); see McCoRmicK, EviEcaE § 157 (1954).
17. It is unlikely that the outdated exceptions reflect relevancy.
See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact.Evidence: England, 46
HARV. L.R.v. 954, 966 (1933).18. See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 768 (1961).
19. See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion. of Similar Fact Evidence:
America, 51 HARv. L. Rav. 988, 1006-07 (1938)._
20. See, e.g., Thomas, Looking Logically at Evidence of Other
Crimes in Oklahoma, 15 OKLA.L.REv. 431 (1962).
21. See, e.g., Note, 78 HAuv. L. REv. 426, 439 (1964).

22. See authorities, note 5 supra.
23. See City of St. Paul v. Greene, 238 Minn. 202,.56 N.W.2d 423
(1952); 37 MiNN. L. REv.608, 609 (1953).
24. State v. Schueller, 120 Minn. 26, 138 N.W. 937 (1912).

25. See State v. Sorenson, 270 Minn. 186, 134 N.W.2d 115 (1965);
State v. Elli, 267 Minn. 185, 125 N.W.2d 738 (1964); State v. Fitchette, 88
Minn. 145, 92 N. W. 527 (1902).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has relinquished its ability to
correct these abuses by delegating the duty to balance the competing interests and to determine admissibility of such evidence to trial courts, 26 while refusing27to reverse the exercise
of such discretion unless clearly abused.
In prosecutions for sexual offenses, courts have been extremely liberal in allowing evidence of additional criminal conduct to be used at trial. s Evidence of similar illicit sexual acts
with the prosecutrix is generally admissible to show the relationship of the parties, as evidence of the intent with which the
act in question was committed, and to indicate lust for a particular person.29 A small minority of jurisdictions admit evidence
of similar illicit sexual acts with other persons, 30 and an even
smaller minority admit different types of such illicit acts with
other persons. 31 By randomly admitting such acts the latter
line of decisions allows unrelated sexual offenses to be introduced to prove the accused's propensity to commit sexual crimes,
thus frustrating the purpose of the exclusionary rule.
This unique attitude in the area of sexual offenses is based
upon a belief that sex criminals have a greater recidivist rate
than those guilty of other offenses.3 2 Recent statistical inquiries,
however, tend to disprove this theory. 33 Furthermore, most
courts indicate little cognizance of the probability that recidivism
34
among sexual offenders varies with the nature of the crime.
Even more unwarranted is the notion that it is more probable
that a sexual offender will commit a sexual offense unrelated to
those he has previously committed than that one who has previously committed a nonsexual offense will commit a sexual
crime.35 Thus it would appear the only valid basis for admitting
26. State v. Hopfe, 249 Minn. 464, 82 N.W.2d 681 (1957).
27. See, e.g., State v. DePauw, 246 Minn. 91, 74 N.W.2d 297 (1955).
28. See 40 MiN. L. REv. 694, 696-97 (1956).
29. See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 841, 896 (1961).
30. See, e.g., State v. DePauw, 246 Minn. 91, 74 N.W.2d 297 (1955);
Bridges v. State, 247 Wis. 350, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945).
31. See, e.g., Wilkins v. State, 29 Ala. App. 349, 197 So. 75 (1940)
(indecent exposure and rape); Commonwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 65
A.2d 348 (1949) (indecent exposure and statutory rape).
32. See 40 MIN. L. REv. 694, 702 (1956).
33. Gregg, supra note 5, at 233.
34. On the basis of social scierice data, it appears certain that perversions, such as homosexuality and exhibitionism, may be highly repetitive. Others, such as child molestation, may involve a majority of offenders who are not repeaters. Still others tend to be isolated events.
See Gregg, supra note 5, at 231.
35. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 65 A.2d 348
(1949). But cf. Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 116 A.2d
867 (1955).
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such evidence in the area of sexual offenses and not in other
areas of criminal conduct is society's abhorrence of sexual
36
crimes.
Minnesota is among the minority which admits evidence of
37
similar sexual offenses with persons other than the prosecutrix.
In the instant case the court expanded the scope of admissibility
to include evidence of sexual offenses unrelated to that for
which the accused was prosecuted. Without the aid of scientific or statistical observations38 and notwithstanding a difference between the two types of conduct involved,39 the court
held them sufficiently similar to warrant admitting evidence of
one at a trial for the other. The court based this holding upon
the dubious ground of recidivism, despite acknowledging that its
validity has been seriously questioned. 40 Due to the tenuity of
this theory of recidivism, a better alternative would be to require the prosecution to introduce reliable evidence of sufficient
similarity between the offenses in question and an interrelated
recidivist rate in order to justify admission of such potentially
prejudicial evidence.
By eliminating the element of surprise through requiring
pretrial disclosure of prior criminal conduct, the Minnesota Supreme Court has substantially reduced the prejudicial effect of
this evidence. Although many feel surprise is merely an incidental cause of prejudice, 41 it is probable that prior knowledge
of additional crimes to be introduced at trial will permit able
defense counsel to mitigate the prejudicial effects of such evidence through vigorous cross-examination. However, because
admission of irrelevant evidence of additional offenses is possible under the exclusionary rule, Minnesota's new requirement
36. See Gregg, supra note 5, at 234.
37. See State v. Arradondo, 260 Minn. 512, 110 N.W.2d 469 (1961);
note 30 supra and accompanying text. A treatise on Minnesota criminal

procedure has included sexual crimes as an exception to the exclusionary rule. JONES, MINNESOTA CRnVMIAL PROCEDURE 78 (2d ed. 1964).
38. See 272 Minn. at 493, 139 N.W.2d at 170. The only statistics
before the court were those of the accused, indicating that the two types
of illicit sexual conduct involved in the case were "diametrically opposed." Brief for Appellant, p. 12.
39. 272 Minn. at 493, 139 N.W.2d at 170.
40. Ibid.
41. See Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion
as Evidence in Prosecutionsfor Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 212, 218
(1965); Shifflet, Admissibility of Evidence Disclosing Other Crimes, 5
HASTINGS L.J. 73 (1953); Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact
Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REv. 954 (1933); Trautman, Logical or
Legal Relevancy - A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 409 (1952);
Note, 37 MmN. L. REv. 608, 609 (1953); 70 YALE L.J. 763, 763-65 (1961).
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of disclosure will not always be adequate to eliminate danger of
severe prejudice. The policy of providing the accused a fair trial,
which was impliedly adopted by Spreigl, would therefore appear
to call for adoption of the inclusionary rule, under which relevancy of such evidence is to be determined in accordance with
the nature of individual cases.
By requiring disclosure of evidence concerning additional
offenses, Spreigl furthers Minnesota's judicial willingness to initiate rules of pretrial discovery. At common law the prosecution was not required to disclose any information, whether as a
matter of course or upon request.42 It was thought that pretrial
disclosure would encourage perjury 43 and would give the accused
an unwarranted advantage, since the accused's right not to divulge incriminating information prevented pretrial discovery by
the prosecution. 44 Until recently these arguments were sufficiently presuasive to prevent pretrial criminal discovery. 45 With
the expanding rights of the accused, 46 however, many courts
have begun to abandon the common law rule prohibiting discovery in favor of granting the accused greater opportunity to
47
prepare his case.
Pretrial discovery serves to protect the accused from surprise 4s and, more important, to permit successful preparation of
the accused's case in order to insure him a fair trial. 49 When
42.
43.

6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1859g (3d ed. 1940).
State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).

44. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923);
see Rosier v. The People, 126 Colo. 82, 91-92, 247 P.2d 448, 453 (1952).

45. State v. Axilrod, 248 Minn. 204, 79 N.W.2d 677 (1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957).

A few limited rights of the accused to in-

formation before trial, however, arose from constitution or statute. See
6 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1851 (3d ed. 1940).
46.

See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

47. See Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12
STAN. L. REV. 293 (1960); Krantz, PretrialDiscovery in Criminal Cases:
A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REV. 127, 146-52
(1963). Although pretrial disclosure of the prosecution's case is not a
constitutional right of the accused, the United States Supreme Court
has recommended and condoned it. See Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504
(1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657 (1957). This favorable attitude has been instrumental in
causing state courts to begin to liberalize criminal discovery. Fletcher,
supra at 303-04. In addition, refutation by legal scholars of the alleged
difficulties with pretrial discovery at criminal law has persuaded courts
to re-evaluate the policies behind their actions. See Fletcher, supra at
312; Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF.
L. REV. 56, 59 (1961).
48. See Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery
in England, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 749 (1964).
49. Louisell, supra note 47, at 82.
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these goals have been pursued, courts have tended to implement
discovery through procedural rules, while legislatures have utilized evidentiary rules.5 0 Unless accompanied by liberal pretrial writs, procedural rules of discovery are quite cumbersome
and seldom useful.5 ' Unfortunately, however, even pretrial
writs have proved to be of little value because of procedural
restrictions upon their issuance.5 2 The accused is therefore often able to rely only upon an appeal after judgment of guilt,
subject to the nearly insurmountable obstacle of proving that
denial of discovery constituted prejudicial error. An accused is
not presented with such difficulties if pretrial discovery is
based upon an evidentiary rule, which renders inadmissible any
evidence subject to discovery which the prosecution has failed
to provide the accused. 53 The evidentiary rule, however, permits
discovery only of that admissible evidence which the prosecution
intends to introduce at trial.54 Such a restriction operates to
impede the accused's preparation for trial by withholding facts
critical to his case, though not themselves admissible into evidence.5 5
Since Minnesota has followed the common law rule against
discovery, 6 the only effective way to become apprised of the
50. See MINN. STAT. § 630.18(2) (1965) (evidentiary rule requiring
disclosure of names of witnesses); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in
Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 228, 245 (1964) (procedural rules
of criminal discovery initiated by California courts).
51. Thus, if the trial court denies pretrial discovery, the accused
can either seek a writ of prohibition or mandamus or appeal an adverse
judgment upon trial. Use of the former confronts an appellate court only
with the question whether the accused has adhered to the procedural
requirements necessary to grant the motion. See Note, 38 So. CAL. L. REV.
251, 262-63 (1965). An appeal on the merits, however, presents the
questions whether the accused was prejudiced by the denial of discovery
and whether there was prejudicial error in light of the entire proceedings in the lower court. Id. at 262-64.
52. It has been said that pretrial writs in California are ineffective
because of procedural difficulties. Id. at 257-61. This difficulty would
also hinder development in Minnesota of a criminal discovery system
based primarily upon writs of prohibition. See JoNEs, M.NNESOTA CnIMINAL

PROcEDURE 164 (2d ed. 1964).

53. Under this rule an appellate court would be confronted only
with the question whether the accused objected properly to the admission of such undisclosed evidence. Prejudice should not have to be
shown. See State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1966).
54. See Louisell, supra note 47, at 66.
55. For example, hearsay evidence, though itself inadmissable, often
leads to admissable evidence which could be critical to the accused's
case. See Traynor, supra note 48, at 757-58.
56. State v. Axilrod, 248 Minn. 204, 79 N.W.2d 677 (1956). The
legislature, however, has enacted a few limited rules of pretrial dis-
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prosecution's case prior to trial has been to rely upon informal
procedures 57 or tactics which, although not intended to elicit
information from the prosecution, often require disclosure of the
prosecution's witnesses and an outline of its case.5 8 State v.
Spreigi is the second case 59 in which the Supreme Court has required the prosecution to disclose information to the defendant
prior to trial.5 0 If the prosecution wishes to introduce evidence
concerning a criminal offense other than that charged, it must
notify the accused prior to trial. This requirement should prove
beneficial to the accused and to the prosecution. Since counsel
for the accused will realize the nature of the evidence with
which he will be confronted, his cross examination will be
more effective, and consequently the severe prejudice heretofore experienced in this area will be substantially mitigated.
On the other hand, the prosecution will be benefited because of
expediency in prosecuting criminal actions. If the accused and
his counsel are fully aware of the prosecution's evidence of prior
covery. MzxxN. STAT. § 630.18(2) (1965) (lists of witnesses before a grand
jury); MiN. STAT. § 611.033 (1965) (statements or confessions made

prior to trial). Although these statutes operate as rules of evidence, requiring disclosure as a matter of course, they have been strictly construed
so as to provide little assistance to an accused. See State v. Drews, 144
N.W.2d 251 (Minn. 1966).

57. Thus counsel for the accused often requests disclosure of the
prosecution's case. If the prosecution thinks it has a strong case, the
request may be honored in the hope of persuading counsel for the accused to urge his client to plead guilty. Louisell, supra note 47, at 59.
Adoption of pretrial criminal discovery has been urged because it will
save substantial expenses of trial by causing more pleas of guilty. Note,
35 U. CINc. L. REV. 195, 204 (1966).
58. Mlu. STAT. § 629.50 (1965) provides for a preliminary hearing
to decide whether an offense has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof. Defense attorneys,
however, often use the hearing to discover the witness and evidence the

prosecution intends to use at trial, since the prosecution must bring
forth proof tending to show commission of the crime by the accused.
59. One week prior to Spreigl, the court ruled that the prosecution
must inform the defendant before trial of any evidence to be introduced
at trial which may raise evidentiary questions regarding search and
seizure or confessions. State ex. rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn.
539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1966). Read in conjunction with the instant case,
Tahash suggests the court's amenability to expansion of pretrial criminal
discovery. Reliance on this development has prompted substantial pretrial disclosure to defendants by the Hennepin County Attorney's office.

See Scott, Criminal Pre-trial Discovery Procedure comes to Minnesota,

(1966).
60. Since the decision in Spreigl, the court has held that after a
witness has testified at trial for the prosecution, the accused must be
supplied a copy of any previous statement the witness has made to the
prosecution which conforms to the standards of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (1965). State v. Grunau, 141 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1966).
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criminal conduct, a plea of guilty as charged is more likely to
result. And some of the inevitable trial calendar congestion
should be reduced.6 1
Despite the progressive attitude towards criminal discovery
demonstrated by Spreigl,6 2 an expanded and more effective system of pretrial discovery in criminal cases is warranted. Discovery can be implemented far more effectively through procedural rather than evidentiary rules. These rules could be supplemented by a liberal system of pretrial writs through which
to appeal adverse determinations without having to establish
prejudicial error at a trial on the merits. Such an effective system of pretrial discovery would serve the interests of both the
accused and the prosecution. The accused would receive greater
assurance of receiving a fair trial, and the prosecution would
be able to enforce criminal laws more expediently.

Insurance:

Excess Insurer's Liability for Defense Costs

Plaintiff, primary automobile liability insurer, after settling
a case for substantially less than its policy limits,' sought to
recover from defendant, excess liability insurer, one-half the expenses and attorney's fees incurred in defending the insured.
The complaint in the original accident case sought damages in
excess of the primary coverage. Each insurer had a provision
in its policy requiring it to defend the insured, but the excess
insurer refused to participate in the defense. Defendant appealed
the trial court's judgment for plaintiff, contending that its contractual obligation to defend the insured was enforceable only by
the insured, not by a stranger to the contract. The Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the excess insurer has an
obligation to pay one-half the expenses and attorney's fees only
when the actual recovery is for more than the primary insurer's
policy limits, regardless of whether the original complaint
sought damages in excess of the primary insurer's limits. American Sur. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 142 N.W.2d
304 (Minn. 1966).
61. See Scott, supra note 59.
62. Fortunately, the court did not believe criminal discovery to be
a legislative function. Because legislative constituents do not believe
liberality towards criminals to be necessary, the legislature has failed to
provide effective sanctions for criminal discovery.
1. The litigation against the insured wherein the dispute between
primary and excess insurers arose is reported in Rahia v. Current, 264
Minn. 465, 119 N.W.2d 699 (1963).
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It is clear that an insurer who issues a policy which includes
a defense provision is contractually obligated to defend an insured if a complaint states a claim within the coverage of the
policy against the insured, 2 even if the claim ultimately proves
groundless, 3 or is only partially within the coverage of the policy. 4 However, since an insured will often be protected by more
than one insurer, it must be determined which insurer will bear
the expense of defending the insured. 5 In some jurisdictions
the incidence of the financial burden of defense depends upon
resolution of the conflict which arises when two insurers
cover a single risk and include "other insurance" clauses in
their policies which purport to limit their coverage when the
risk is also covered under another policy. For example, one
policy may provide that if there is other insurance, the two
policies are prorated according to their liability limits,6 while
another policy may provide that it will indemnify the insured
7
only for amounts in excess of coverage by other insurance.
2. See Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Youghiogheny & Ohio
Coal Co., 214 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1954); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1954); Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co.,
264 Minn. 378, 119 N.W.2d 703 (1963); Christian v. Royal Ins. Co., 185
Minn. 180, 240 N.W. 365 (1932).
3. See, e.g., Hansen v. Globe Indem. Co., 127 F. Supp. 260 (D. Minn.
1954), rev'd, 231 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1956); Minnesota Elec. Distrib. Co. v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 173 Minn. 114, 216 N.W. 784 (1927).
4. See Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 104 N.W.2d 19 (1960); Gottula
v. Standard Reliance Ins. Co., 165 Neb. 1, 84 N.W.2d 179 (1957); Black
Hills Kennel Club v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 77 S.D. 503, 94 N.W.2d
90 (1959). See generally IA APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcTIcE §
4681-94 (1962); CoucH, INSURANCE § 51:142 (2d ed. 1961); Note, Determination of an Insurer's Duty to Defend, 34 TEmp. L.Q. 152 (1961); Note,
The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 734 (1966).
5. The most frequent example of this occurs when an auto operator is covered by his policy's "substitute vehicle" provision, and is also
an additional insured under the "omnibus clause" of the owner's policy.
6. If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered
by this policy-the company shall riot be liable under this policy
for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit
of liability stated in the declaration bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against
such loss.
Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 34, 366 P.2d 455,
459 (1961).
7. If the insured has other valid and collectible insurance
against a loss covered by this policy, the insurance under this
policy shall be excess insurance with respect to such loss but
shall apply only in the amount by which the applicable limit
of liability stated in the declarations exceeds the total applicable limits of liability of such other insurance.
Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 619, 301
P.2d 602, 604 (1956).
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Thus, in those jurisdictions, if an insured is covered by two policies, one with a pro rata clause and the other with an excess
clause, the insurer who provides for pro rata coverage becomes
the primary insurer. The other insurer becomes the excess insurer, with an obligation to pay only if the injured party recovers
a judgment in excess of the primary insurer's liability limits. 8
Since the obligation to defend arises if there is a potential obligation to indemnify, the excess insurer must dontribute to the
cost of the insured's defense only if the amount recovered against
the insured exceeds the primary insurer's policy limits. Presumably, the measure of liability is an equal division of the total
cost of defense.10
In other jurisdictions, however, when two "other insurance"
clauses conflict, the clauses are ignored, the liability is prorated
according to the respective policy limits, 12 and the cost of defense
12
is similarly prorated.
A third group of jurisdictions does not resolve the conflict
over liability for the costs of defense by determining liability
for a judgment against the insured. Instead, the nature of the
insurer's contractual obligation to defend determines this liability. The obligation to defend is generally defined according to
either of two distinct views, each of which leads to a different
result. Under one view since the duty to defend is distinct from
the duty to respond to a judgment, both insurers are obligated
to defend the insured when a complaint seeks damages which
would implicate both of them. Under this view, .a primary in8. See McFarland v. Chicago Exp.Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952);

National Indem. Co. v. Lead Supplies, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 249 (D. Minn.

1960); Eicher v. Universal Underwriters, 250 Minn. 7, 83 N.W.2d 895
(1957); Speier v. Ayling, 158 Pa. Super. 404, 45 A.2d 385 (1946).
9. "If, however, the only loss [insured by the excess insurer]: -is
to be the cost of defense, we are satisfied that it should fall upon the
primary coverage." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Norwich Union -Fire Ins. Soc.,
221 Cal. App. 2d 150, 154, 34 Cal. Rptr. 406,408 (1963); accord, Fireman's

Fund Indem. Co. v. Freeport Ins. Co., 30 Ill. App. 2d 69, 173 N.E.2d 543
(1961); National Farmers U. Prop.-& Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 14
Utah 2d 89, 377 P.2d 786 (1963).
10. See cases cited note 9 supra.
11. See Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952); Continental Cas. Co. v. General Acc. Fire
& Life Assur. Corp., 175 F. Supp. 713 (D. Ore. 1959), ajf'd,. 287 F.2d 464
(9th Cir. 1961); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore.
110, 341 P.2d 110 (1959). See generally Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect of Double Coverage and "Other Insurance" Clauses, 38
MANq. L. REV. 838 (1954); 43 MiNN.L. REv. 153 (1958); 5 STAN. L. REv.
147 (1952); 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 157 (1958); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502 (1961).
12. See, e.g., General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v.Continental
Cas. Co., supra note 11.
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surer is entitled to recover a portion of the costs of defense
from an excess insurer, even if the amount of the judgment
against the insured is less than the primary insurer's liability
limits. 13 The other view, which also focuses on the obligation to
defend, maintains that the obligation to defend runs only between the insured and the insurer. Thus, if one insurer defends
an action, it cannot recover from the other, irrespective of
14
whether or not the other insurer is forced to pay the judgment.
On facts similar to those of the instant case, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held the complaint initially filed against an insured resolved this dilemma. 15 When the complaint sought damages which would implicate both insurers they would have to
split the cost of defense. Thus, liability for the expense of defending the insured arose from the obligation to defend as determined by the complaint. Without discussion of this approach,
however, the court in the instant case shifted its position by
basing the burden of paying the cost of the insured's defense
upon the obligation to satisfy a judgment against the insured.
Of primary importance to the court was the lack of contractual
agreement between the insurers which would give the primary
insurer a right to demand participation in the defense of the
insured by the excess insurer or to recover compensation because of its nonperformance.'
In stating that no contractual
obligation existed to make one insurer accountable to the other
13. It has been suggested that one insurer should be allowed to
recover on a quantum meruit theory from another who refuses to defend.
See, e.g., Brunner v. McCullough, 216 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1963);

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 164 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), affd mer., 264 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1959).
14. See, e.g., Western American Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 295
F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1961); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State
Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1960) (duty to defend is personal);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 164 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn.
1958). Contra, General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 287 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1961), affirming, 175 F. Supp. 713 (D. Ore.
1959).
15. Eicher v. Universal Underwriters, 250 Minn. 7, 83 N.W.2d 895
(1957).
16. A third party beneficiary may not enforce a contract or recover
for the breach thereof, unless it appears from the terms and accompanying circumstances that the promisee's purpose for entering into the con-

tractual agreement was to confer a benefit upon that third person.
Where the promisee intends primarily to benefit himself by entering
into a contract, as with automobile insurance, and a third person is only
indirectly benefited thereby, such third person is deemed to be an incidental beneficiary with no right to enforce the contract. See 4 CotnD,
CONTRACTS § 779C (1951); GisoaSRE, CoNRAcTs § 238 (2d ed. 1965);
SIMPsoN, CONTRACTS § 117 (2d ed. 1965); RESTATeMENT, CONTRACTS § 133
(1932).
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for a breach of its independent obligation to the insured, the
court appeared to view the obligations of defending an insured
and paying for that defense as separate obligations exclusively
between an insurer and its insured.
Suggested in the court's opinion are two policy considerations. One is skepticism of the validity of monetary claims
made by aggrieved parties against insureds. Since the excess
insurer's refusal to defend may have been prompted by its independent investigation of the accident from which it might have
concluded that the damage suffered was not as great as that
alleged, the court may have wanted to give this estimate of
17
damage as much weight as the estimate in the complaint.
Another apparent concern was preservation of an excess insurer's
option to refuse to defend and pay any excess judgment plus
one-half the attorney's fees, rather than to incur the expense
of retaining counsel to represent its insured.,
Several arguments can be advanced to show that the decision in the instant case is more reasonable than a rationale
based upon either the inherent nature of an insurer's obligation to defend or the damages alleged in the complaint. While
the obligations to defend and to respond to a judgment are
separate in the sense that they require an insurer to perform
wholly different functions, they are closely related functions in
the sense that the duty to defend depends entirely upon an initial
potential liability to satisfy a judgment. 19 Implicit in the duty
to defend in the single insurer situation is the duty to pay for
that defense. In the primary-excess insurer situation, however,
it appears reasonable to shift the excess insurer's duty to pay
for the insured's defense from the situation of potential liability
to that of actual liability, without depriving the insured of defense counsel. In so doing, the relationship of the duties to
defend and to satisfy a judgment against the insured can be
preserved by predicating the obligation to pay defense costs upon
a precedent actual obligation to respond for damages against the
insured.
In addition, the practical considerations underlying a ration17. 142 N.W.2d at 306.
18. Ibid.
19. "The two [obligation to defend and obligation to respond to
a judgment] are, of course, related in the sense that if the occurrence
set forth in the plaintiff's claim is one for which . . . there would be
no liability under the policy to pay the claim, no duty to defend ever
arose." American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Penn. Threshermen & Farmers' Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 1960).
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ale based on the nature of the obligation to defend are absent
in the primary-excess insurer situation. In the situation involving a single insurer, in order to avoid or to minimize liability, an insurer desires control of the insured's defense at an
early date. This procedure also protects the insured; if he had
to wait until a final verdict on the claim against him to ascertain
whether he had a right to representation, the rationale behind
defense provisions would be undermined, and the protection for
which an insured pays a heavy premium would be essentially
denied. In -a situation where two insurers are potentially implicated, however, by waiting until the ultimate recovery is
known in order to ascertain the excess insurer's obligation for
the expenses of defense, neither has the insured been denied
counsel, since the primary insurer has a duty to defend based
upon the pleadings, nor has an unreasonable risk of monetary
liability been imposed upon the excess insurer, since the primary
insurer can best protect its own self-interest by minimizing the
judgment against its insured.
Finally, if the primary insurer refused to defend, and the
excess insurer either settles the action for less than the primary
insurer's policy limits or is successful in defending the claim,
liability for the costs of defending the insured must be allocated.
If such liability is based upon the nature of the obligation to
defend, the excess insurer would have to bear the cost of defense. 20 Certainly such a rule would not encourage an excess
insurer to defend an insured upon default of the primary insurer, when by refusing to defend, thus forcing the insured to
look to a third person for his defense, the excess insurer could
decrease its chances of incurring liability. 21 If such liability is

based upon liability to satisfy a judgment against the insured,
however, the excess insurer could recover its costs of defending
from the primary insurer.22 Such a rule would encourage an
excess insurer to defend the insured if the primary insurer defaults, since the excess insurer would be liable for a judgment
against the insured and expenses of defending only if the recovery exceeds the primary policy limits.
Although the court did not consider the issue of contribution, it is clear from an examination of Minnesota case law that
20. See cases cited note 14 supra.
21. This result necessarily follows even in those jurisdictions where
the obligation to defend is viewed as personal and separate, since the
excess insurer may escape liability if the insured decides to pursue only
the primary insurer for its breach of duty.
22. See note 9 supra.
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the lower court's holding could not be affirmed on this theory.
It is settled that contribution is allowable only where there is
joint liability or a common obligation. 23 Each insurer's obligation to defend its insured is derived from a separate contractual
agreement, and where separate instruments which create a similar obligation have been involved, Minnesota courts have not
considered this to be a "common obligation" for the purpose of
24
invoking the principle of contribution.
In the instant case the court also rejected the primary insurer's argument that it was entitled to subrogation against the
excess insurer for its refusal to defend the insured. Subrogation
can be either conventional or legal.25 The former deals with
contractual rights, while the latter deals with the notion of fair
play requiring the burden of ultimate payment to fall upon
the party who bears the greater obligation. 26 "It is well settled that the right of subrogation does not obtain in favor of
one who discharges a debt in the performance of his own obligation, nor where the equities are equal. ' 27 Thus, to recover by
28
way of legal subrogation a superior equity must be shown.
Since the obligation to defend an insured is separate and dis29
tinct from the obligation to pay a judgment against him, if
each of two insurers has an obligation to defend, the equities
are at best equal.30 Consequently, no right of recovery in the
instant case could be justified on the principle of legal subrogation. Moreover, conventional subrogation did not afford the
primary insurer in the instant case a remedy through recovery
under the subrogation clause in its policy. Since an insurer can
23. See, e.g., County of Dodge v. Martin, 271 Minn. 489, 136 N.W.2d
652 (1965); Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956);
London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954);
Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954).
24. See Iartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Anderson, 192 Minn. 200,
256 N.W. 185 (1934); County of Dodge v. Martin, supra note 23.
25. See generally 50 Am. Jun. Subrogation § 3 (1944); 83 C.J.S.
Subrogation §§ 3, 4 (1953).
26. See, e.g., Bennett v.Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 192 F.2d 748 (10th
Cir. 1951); Southern Sur. Co. v. Tessum, 178 Minn. 495, 228 N.W. 326
(1929).
27. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Petroleum Pipe Line Co., 83 F.2d
412, 414 (10th Cir. 1936); accord, City of Marshall v.Gregoire, 193 Minn.
188, 259 N.W.377 (1935).

28. See Amick v.Columbia Cas. Co., 101 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1939).
29. See, e.g., American Fid. & Cas. Co.v.Pennsylvania Threshermen
& Farmers'Mut.Cas. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1960); 7A APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4684 (1962).

30. See Southern Sur. Co. v. Tessum, 178 Min. 495, 228 N.W.326
(1929).
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acquire no greater rights than are possessed by its insured,3 1 no
right to subrogation exists regarding an excess insurer's obligation to defend if the insured is without rights against the excess insurer. Because the insured in the instant case had not
been damaged by the excess insurer's breach of its obligation to
defend, due to the primary insurer's similar obligation, the insured and therefore the primary insurer were totally without
32
rights against the excess insurer.
The practical implications of the instant case should be beneficial to an insured. A primary insurer will be eager to defend
in order to minimize its liability, but should it refuse to defend,
the excess insurer will be motivated to take up the defense in
order to avoid an excess judgment and the resultant sharing

of expenses of defending the insured.

Judicial Review: New Prospective
Overruling Technique Applied
Plaintiff, a parent of defendant, brought an action for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The trial court
granted plaintiff's motion to strike the defense of intrafamily
tort immunity. The supreme court affirmed holding that the
defense of intrafamily tort immunity' was not available to a child
sued by his parent in the case at bar and in all future cases involving claims arising after the filing of the instant opinion.
Batts v. Batts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
Traditionally decisions overruling common law precedents
have been given retroactive effect.2 Retroactive application of
overruling decisions was thought to follow from the Blackstonian
premise that the courts find rather than make law and, therefore, that a discarded precedent was never the law but merely
erroneous evidence of it. 3 However, in this century such retro31. See, e.g., Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Griffin Constr. Co.,
280 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1955); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Don Allen
Chevrolet Co., 253 N.C. 243, 116 S.E.2d 780 (1960). See also 29A AM.
Jup. Insurance § 1720 (1960).
32. 142 N.W.2d at 306.
1. For a discussion of this aspect of the case see 51 MINN. L. REv.
370 (1966).
2. See generally Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
3. 1 BLACKSTONE'S CoMMENTAtRms 69-70. See generally, BTLACR,
JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 689-99 (1912); SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 170 (2d ed.
1907).

19661

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

activity has often been limited in situations where reliance on
the prior law4 or the need for stability 5 has been found to outweigh the desirability of a prompt and complete overturning
of an erroneous rule of law. An overruling decision is wholly
prospective if the newly announced rule is applied only to fact
situations accruing after the filing of the instant opinion.0
Many jurisdictions, believing that a wholly prospective limitation
would discourage litigation of erroneous precedents,7 apply the
new rule to the case at bar although otherwise prospectively.8
In Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 6219 and Jeruzal
v. Jeruzal,10 the Minnesota court adopted a unique method of
prospective overruling by postponing the effective date of the
new rule until the end of the following legislative session." By
delaying application of the new rule beyond the date of the overruling decision, persons who have relied on the prior law are
given an opportunity to accommodate the new rule and hold
themselves harmless from their reliance. 12 However, the referThe Blackstonian concept has been rejected by commentators as an
unrealistic fiction since the nineteenth century. 2 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 665 (4th ed. 1873); GRAY, Tim NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 218-40 (2d ed. 1927); HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 66 (12th ed.
1917); HOLMES, COMON LAW 35 (1881); Thayer, Judicial Legislation:
Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law, 5 HARv.
L. REV. 172 (1891).
4. Reliance on prior decisions is the chief rationale advanced to
justify prospective overruling. AUERBACH, GARRISON, HURST & MIERMIN,
THE LEGAL PROCESS 175 (1961); Littlefield, Stare Decisis, Prospective
Overruling, and Judicial Legislation in the Context of Sovereign Immunity, 9 ST. Louis L.J. 56, 79 (1964); Note, 60 HARV. L. REv. 437, 440
(1947).
5. See Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective

Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201 (1965).
precedent is not overruled.

Stability is best protected when

Id. at 235-36.

However, given an over-

ruling, stability is affected less if there is a prospective limitation. Id.
at 240.

6. E.g., Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358
(1932). Mishkin, Forward: The High Court, The Great Writ, and Due
Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 70 n.47 (1965); Note, 46
IOWA L. REv. 600, 614 (1961).
7. Commentators have argued that this fear is exaggerated.
AUERBACH, GARRISON, HURST & MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS 177 (1961);
Currier, supra note 5, at 215; see Note, 60 HARV. L. REV. 437, 440 (1960).

8. E.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.

2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). However, the Molitor technique may be
subject to constitutional questions. See 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 58-59
(1962).
9. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
10. 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964).
11. See Note, 51 MiNN. L. REV. 79 (1966).
12. See Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MNw. L. REv. 265, 302 (1963).
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ence to the legislative session by Spanel and Jeruzal suggests
that the technique was adopted by the court primarily as a
means of reconciling the respective roles of the court and legislature in the area of law reform. 13 Postponement of the effective
date of the new rule beyond the following legislative session
will eliminate the hardship and inconvenience caused by the
application of an interim rule between the date of the overruling decision and the enactment of legislation concerning the
matter. It will also preserve the status quo pending legislative
consideration.
By applying the new rule to the case at bar, Balts departs
from the strong statements of the court in prior decisions adopting a wholly prospective technique. 14 Such a technique places
the plaintiff in an unduly advantageous position for no other
reason than he has raised the issue being decided. 1 The possibility that litigation of erroneous precedents would be discouraged by a wholly prospective overruling does not seem an
adequate justification. A wholly prospective limitation could be
applied consistently against institutional litigants without discouraging litigation incentive. 16 Similarly, unless it is consistently applied, a wholly prospective limitation will not discourage
noninstitutional litigants.' 7
The Balts court found a prospective limitation upon its deciHowever, it is
sion demanded by reliance on the prior law.'
of a prospecapplication
the
justifies
reliance
doubtful whether
tort claims
parent-child
most
tive technique to the case. Since
would
the
tort-feasor
of
automobiles,
operation
arise from the
liability
acquired
retroactively
for
any
indemnified
be
normally
by a general liability insurance policy. In such cases, defendants
not having such coverage would not be prejudiced since they
presumably would not have had such coverage in any event.
If they had been concerned about potential liability, possible
liability to third parties presumably would have prompted them
to purchase general liability insurance.
Thus only the insurer has relied to his detriment. However,
13. See Note, 51 AIN. L. REV. 79 (1966).
14. Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 195 (1964); Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 292-93 (1962).
15. See Mishkin, supra note 6, at 61 n.23.
16. See id. at 61 n.20.
17. See id. at 61.
18. "Parties who are affected will now have an opportunity to
secure insurance, investigate claims, negotiate settlements, adjust rates,
and, if need be, revise coverage in anticipation of a new exposure." 273
Minn. at 431, 142 N.W.2d at 74.
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there are factors mitigating this hardship. A general liability
policy may be viewed, in part, as insurance against overruling. 9
Furthermore, since the insurer can spread the risk subsequently,
retroactive application of an overruling decision against an insurer will not create a substantial hardship. 20 Finally, the reliance of the insurer upon the prior law may be minimal. There
is some suggestion that legal principles are not a substantial con21
sideration in determining insurance premiums.
Under the instant facts, the prospective limitation may have
been applied to reduce the possibility of legislative opposition
to the substance of the new rule. Insurance interests will certainly object to the rule announced in Balts for much the same
reasons that they advocate guest statutes and inter spousal tort
immunity.2 2 If the decision had not been limited prospectively
and the legislature viewed the retroactive application of the new
rule to operate unfairly, the possibility of a legislative reaction
to the substance of the holding would be heightened. 23 Although
the reliance argument in this case is unpersuasive, the possibility
that it may be accepted as valid by the legislature may justify
a prospective limitation.
However, to the extent the court was prompted by considerations relating to a legislative reaction, Balts represents a departure from the overruling method used in Spanel and Jeruzal.
Since rationales advanced for the Spanel-Jeruzal technique relate to accommodating the legislative reaction to a new rule, the
court, by implication, has abandoned the unique method of prospective overruling in favor of a more orthodox technique.

19.

See

DUNHAm,

MoDERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS,

ed. 1958); Currier, supra note 5, at 245.

762 n.39 (2d

20. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 463, 492-93 (1961).
21. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Acturarial ProcessThe Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 579-81 (1961); Peck,
Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MIcH.
L. REv. 689, 718 (1960).
22. 51 Mnvx. L. REV. 79, 89-90 (1966).
23. See Mishkin, supra note 6.
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Local Government: State Pre-emption Invalidates
Municipal Licensing
Plaintiff, an electrical contracting firm, operated its business under a master electrician's license issued by the state.1
Defendant municipality enacted an ordinance requiring electrical
contractors to obtain a municipal license before performing electrical work within its jurisdiction. Plaintiff paid the fifteen
dollar fee for the municipal license under protest and sued to
recover the license fee and to enjoin the municipality from requiring licenses in the future. The lower court held the ordinance valid. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding
the state had pre-empted the field of licensing electrical contractors and, therefore, that the ordinance was invalid. Minnetonka Elec. Co. v. Village of Golden Valley, 273 Minn. 301, 141
N.W.2d 138 (1966).
In Minnesota, municipalities have no inherent powers but
possess only those powers expressly conferred by the state or
2
implied as necessary to implement express grants of power.
Power to regulate local business activities has been implied from
the general welfare clause of municipal charters and empowering statutes. 3 Generally, the power to license has been found
to be within the power to regulate and extends to permit a
municipality, in the exercise of its police power, to regulate by
license any trade or business which may injuriously affect the
4
public health, morals, safety, convenience or welfare.
However, there are substantial limitations upon the licensing
power of a municipality. A municipality has been held powerless to regulate recreational boating on the ground that such
activity is not local in character but requires a state-wide uni1. AWmN. STAT. § 326.25(1) (1965).
2. Village of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 255 Minn. 334, 96 N.W.2d
585 (1959); Tousley v. Leach, 180 Minn. 293, 230 N.W. 788 (1930); 3
YoKLEY, MuN CiPAL CORPORArEONS § 521(b) (1965); see State ex rel.

Childs v. Darrow, 65 Minn. 419, 67 N.W. 1012 (1896); Harrington v.
Town of Plainview, 27 Minn. 224, 6 N.W. 777 (1880). See also Bernick
v. City of Little Falls, 191 Minn. 128, 253 N.W. 369 (1934).
3. The regulatory power implied from a general welfare clause of
a municipal charter is not limited to businesses and trades specifically
enumerated in the charter, but allows a city council to reach new situations as they arise. E.g., State ex rel. Remick v. Clousing, 205 Minn.
296, 285 N.W. 711 (1939) (plasterers); State v. Morrow, 175 Minn. 386,
221 N.W. 423 (1928) (parking lots); Crescent Oil Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 175 Minn. 276, 221 N.W. 6 (1923) (gasoline filling stations).
4. City of St. Paul v. Dalsin, 245 Minn. 325, 71 N.W.2d 855 (1955).
See also Lyons v. City of Minneapolis, 241 Minn. 439, 63 N.W.2d 585
(1954); State ex rel. Remick v. Clousing, supra note 3.
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formity of regulation.

Since a municipality cannot levy taxes

without legislative authorization, 6 municipal licensing provisions
have also been invalidated when the fee exacted is so excessive
as to constitute a revenue measure. 7 Finally, a municipality
may not enact regulatory or licensing provisions which conflict
with state legislation.8 Nevertheless, it has seldom been found
that the mere existence of a state statute precludes nonconflicting municipal regulation.9 In Minnetonka the court first
answered the question whether state licensing statutes pre-empt
the field, precluding all municipal measures licensing the same
activity. 10
The court could reasonably have avoided this issue by finding the license fee to be a tax." Since the only prerequisites
to the issuance of a license by defendant municipality were possession of a state master electrician's license and payment of the
5. Village of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 255 Minn. 334, 96 N.W.2d
585 (1959).
6. Park v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 159 N.W. 627 (1916);
Davidson v. County Comm'rs of Ramsey County, 18 Minn. 432 (1872);
Cover v. Town of Baytown, 12 Minn. 124 (1866); see International Harvester Co. v. State, 200 Minn. 242, 274 N.W. 217 (1937).
7. E.g., Lyons v. City of Minneapolis, 241 Minn. 439, 63 N.W.2d 585
(1954); Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 109, 52
N.W.2d 120 (1952); State v. Labo's Direct Serv., 232 Minn. 175, 44 N.W.
2d 823 (1950). The license fee must be reasonable and intended to cover
only the expense of issuing the license, services of the officers, and
other direct or indirect expenses imposed or incurred. See Lyons v.
City of Minneapolis, supra; Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis,
supra.
8. A municipal ordinance "cannot authorize what a statute forbids
or forbid what a statute expressly permits, but it may supplement a
statute or cover an authorized field of local legislation unoccupied by
general legislation." Power v. Nordstrom, 150 Minn. 228, 232, 184 N.W.
967, 969 (1921).
9. But see State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959),
where defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated in violation
of a municipal ordinance. State law required municipalities to adopt
traffic ordinances providing penalties identical to those of the corresponding state statute. The court found that procedures as well as penalties should be uniform throughout the state, and held that procedural
application of this ordinance had to comply with the state statutory
privilege of a jury trial. See also City of St. Paul v. Ulmer, 261 Minn.
178, 111 N.W.2d 612 (1961).
10. Other state courts are divided on the question. See 3 A.NTmAU,
MuNicnAL CoaRoRATiox LAw § 24.07 (1966); 9 McQun.LiNn MuNicIPAL
ComRoRATioNs § 26.23a (3d ed. rev. 1965); 3 YoimEY, MNIcipAL ComRoRATiONS § 522 (1965).
11. Most of the authorities relied upon by the court rested on this
ground rather than a finding of state pre-emption. See Wilkie v. City
of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 58 N.E. 1004 (1900); 9 McQumLIN, op. cit. supra
note 10, § 26.24.
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license fee,12 the licensing ordinance served no apparent regulatory function but was essentially a revenue raising measure.
While no Minnesota case has held absence of regulatory purpose
to be grounds for invalidating a municipal license, application
of the established criteria, requiring a determination whether
the license fee is excessive and e.xhorbitant, 13 would seem to
lead to this result. Certainly the determination of the reasonableness of the license fee must be made with reference to the
costs of the regulatory function served. If there is no regulatory function even a nominal fee should be found excessive.
A judicial determination of state pre-emption is based on a
conclusion that the intent of the legislature was to preclude
municipal licenses. 1 4 Such an intent has occasionally been found
explicit in the language of state statutes.' 5 Due to the lack of
recorded legislative history, extrinsic evidence of legislative intent is seldom available.' 6 In the instant case, defendant municipality argued that legislation expressly prohibiting municipal licensing of plumbers' 7 and detectives' constituted a recognition of the implied power of municipalities to license activities
licensed by the state and showed an intent that other state licensing statutes should not be pre-emptive. 19 However, because
12. Municipal licenses -are rarely revoked or denied to an applicant
possessing a valid state license. See Letter from Clyde Jodell, Administrative Assistant, Department of Inspections, City of Minneapolis, to
author, July 13, 1966.
13. See Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 109,
52 N.W.2d 120 (1952) ($100 license fee per streetcar invalid); State v.
Labo's Direct Serv., 232 Minn. 175, 44 N.W.2d 823 (1950) ($35 license fee
per gasoline filling station plus $10 for each pump in excess of one invalid); Crescent Oil Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 177 Minn. 539, 225 N.W.
904 (1929) ($100 license fee per gasoline filling station invalid); City of
Mankato v. Fowler, 32 Minn. 364, 20 N.W. 361 (1884) ($300 license fee
for auctioneer invalid).
14. Blease, Civil Liberties and the California Law of Preemption,
17 HASTINGS L.J. 517 (1966); see 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 5.22 (1966); 50 CALIF. L. REV. 740 (1962); 36 So. CAL. L. REV. 430 (1963).
15. E.g., Coculo v. City of Trenton, 85 N.J. Super. 523, 205 A.2d 340
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964); Galante v. Teaneck Dept. of Health, 70 N.J.
Super. 362, 175 A.2d 490 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1961); see Craig v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 202 Miss. 207, 30 So. 2d 798 (1947); Craig v. Walker, 191
Miss. 424, 2 So. 2d 806 (1941); Janke v. City of Milwaukee, 202 Wis.
214, 231 N.W. 261 (1930); E. L. Husting Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 200
Wis. 434, 228 N.W. 502 (1930).
16. Finley, Book Review, 24 IND. L.J. 328, 330 (1949).
17. Mm. STAT. § 326.38 (1965).
18. MINN. STAT. § 326.331 (1965).
19. Brief for Respondent, p. 9. The lower court adopted this reasoning in holding that the state had not pre-empted the field of licensing
electrical contractors.
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the several statutes concerning the regulation and licensing of
trades and businesses were enacted by different legislatures, it
is not unlikely that the lack of prohibiting language in many of
these statutes is the result of a failure to consider the problem
of potential municipal licensing provisions. 20 Thus, the court's
conclusion that the limited extrinsic evidence available was inconclusive appears valid.
Upon failure of extrinsic evidence, courts have made a determination of legislative intent on several theories. Some have
implied an intent that municipal power be denied from the
mere existence of a state licensing statute, 2 1 finding that a licensee of the state was intended to be given authority to conduct22
the activity throughout the state without local interference.
Others have imputed an intent that23 there should be state-wide
uniformity of regulation in the area.
The determination whether the doctrine of state pre-emption is properly invoked appears to be made according to the
same criteria under both theories. The need for uniform state
to
regulation is weighed against the needs of local governments
24
satisfy the particular requirements of their communities.
In the instant case the court did not balance these interests but merely found no significant local need for the power to
20. See 72 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1959); 17 HASTINGS L.J. 603 (1966);
35 So. CAL. L. REv. 430 (1963); 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 440 (1963); 7 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 102 (1960).
21. Some jurisdictions, however, find concurrent licensing power
to exist in such situations. Atwater v. City of Sarasota, 38 So. 2d 681
(Fla. Sup. Ct. 1949); Town of Cicero v. Weilander, 35 Il1. App. 2d 456,
183 N.E.2d 40 (1962); City of Chicago v. Michalowski, 318 Ill. App. 533,
48 N.E.2d 541 (1943); State ex rel. City of Bozeman, 68 Mont. 435, 219
Pac. 810 (1923); see Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646
(1934).
22. Agnew v. City of Culver City, 51 Cal. 2d 474, 334 P.2d 571
(1959); Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 385 (1958).
Some courts, in holding that state licenses permit businesses to be conducted anywhere in the state, confuse pre-emption with conflict by declaring municipal licenses of the business void as being in conflict with
the state licensing. Beard v. City of Atlanta, 91 Ga. App. 584, 86 S.E.2d
672 (1955); Pape v. Westerdale, 254 Iowa 1356, 121 N.W.2d 159 (1963);
Trimble v. City of Topeka, 147 Kan. 111, 75 P.2d 241 (1938); C. L. Maier
Co. v. City of Canton, 94 Ohio L. Abs. 434, 201 N.E.2d 609 (C.P. 1964);
Auxter v. City of Toledo, 173 Ohio St. 444, 183 N.E.2d 920 (1962).
23. See City of Flagstaff v. Associated Dairy Prods. Co., 75 Ariz.

254, 255 P.2d 191 (1953); State ex rel. McElroy v. City of Akron, 173
Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962).
24. See 50 CALIF. L. REV. 740 (1962); 49 CALIF. L. REv. 331 (1961);
10 U.C.LA.L. Rsv. 440 (1963). See generally Montgomery, State PreEmption and Local Legislation, 4 SANTA CLARA LAW. 188 (1964); 72
HARV. L. REV. 737 (1959).
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license. The court stated that municipal powers to regulate
building construction, to prescribe requirements for electrical
work, and to inspect the quality of electrical installations 25 were
sufficient to protect local interests. 26 While the court did not
discuss the need for state-wide uniformity, such a need does
exist. Commercial activities not confined within city or county
boundaries could be substantially affected by a lack of uniformity. Flat license fees imposed by municipalities require individuals engaging in occupations which extend beyond municipal
boundaries to bear a greater burden than those carrying on
their business within a single municipality. Thus, such fees
have a discriminatory effect upon intercity business and tend to
restrain interstate commerce. 27 The expenses of municipal regulation could be funded proportionately and fairly by increasing
building permit fees.
Because the court makes no reference to the need for uniformity, the Minnetonka opinion could be read as denying municipalities the power to license whenever there is no significant local need for such power and state licensing legislation
does not expressly grant concurrent power to the municipalities. 28

However, in a subsequent case, Mangold Midwest Co. v.

25.
26.

Mnqx. STAT. § 326.32(1) (1965).
It could be argued that while the municipal license was not so

Village of Richfield,29 the Minnesota court stated that its decision in Minnetonka was based upon a balancing of state and local
interests. The predominant consideration set forth in Mangold
is whether the additional local regulation would have an adverse
effect upon the general populace of the state.
It has been argued that the doctrine of state pre-emption should be applied to exclude municipal ordinances only in
the clearest cases.30 Others have asserted that, absent a specific

the instant case, the municipality should not be denied the power
local licensing requirement to provide a protection for its citizens
that created by state regulation.
See 49 CALIF. L. REv. 331 (1961); see also 1 ANTIEAU, MU iCIPAL
CORPORATION LAW § 5.22 (1966); Blease, supra note 14. See generally
72 HAmv. L. Rlv. 737 (1959).
28. The reliance of the court upon State ex rel. Sheldon v. City of
Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 691, 122 S.E.2d 427 (1964), which held municipalities powerless to license plumbers, tends to support this conclusion.
29. 143 N.W.2d 813 (1966).
30. 1 ANTiAU, MuNICiPAL CORPORATION LAW § 5.22 (1966); 20 U.
CiNc. L. REV. 400, 406 (1951). See generally Montgomery, supra note 24;
Some writers have concluded that the
7 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 102 (1960).
doctrine of pre-emption should not be discarded, but that the policy
considerations which motivate their decisions should be clearly explained
used in
to use a
beyond
27.
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expression of legislative intent, municipal ordinances should
never be found pre-empted by state legislation.3 1 However, since
there is not a sufficient political pressure within municipal government to adequately protect state interests, the courts are the
only means by which those interests may be vindicated when the
legislature has not expressly set forth its intent. Therefore,
the doctrine of state pre-emption can serve a useful function in
this area. Its limits, however, should be clearly stated so that
municipalities are not foreclosed from enacting necessary regulatory measures which do not substantially interfere with state
interests.

Property: Possessory Exception of the Marketable
Title Act Narrowly Applied to Easements
Plaintiff, property owner, and its bus station tenant sought
enjoin
defendant from interfering with the tenant's use of an.
to
right
of way over a portion of defendant's property adalley
tract. This right of way easement had been
plaintiff's
joining
by
a former owner in plaintiff's chain of title.
in
1883
acquired
Subsequently, the dominant and servient tracts were transferred
several times, the real estate description in each conveyancing
instrument including the easement. The defendant asserted that
plaintiffs had lost their claim on the property because they
failed to record the incumbrance as required by the Minnesota
Marketable Title Act.' The plaintiffs, however, claimed to have
by the courts. 50 CZLiF. L. REV. 740 (1962); 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 430
(1963); 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 440 (1963).
31. See, e.g., 1 ANTiEAU, MuCIciPAL CORPORATION LAw § 5.22 (1966).
See generally Montgomery, supra note 24.
1. MINN.STAT. § 541.023(1) (1965).
As against a claim of title based upon a source of title, which
source has been of record at least 40 years, no action affecting
the possession or title of any real estate shall be commenced by
a person, partnership, corporation, state, or any political division
thereof, after January 1, 1948, to enforce any right, claim, interest, incumbrance or lien founded upon any instrument, event or
transaction which was executed or occurred more than 40 years
prior to the commencement of such action unless within 40 years
after such execution or occurrence there has been recorded in
the office of the register of deeds or filed in the office of the register of titles in the county in which the real estate affected is
situated, a notice sworn to by the claimant or his agent or attorney setting forth the name of the claimant, a description of the
real estate affected and of the instrument, event or transaction
on which such claim is founded, and stating whether the right,
claim, interest, incumbrance or lien is mature or immature. ...

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:306

made sufficient use of the easement to qualify for the act's possessory exception.2 Plaintiffs' witnesses testified that between
1936 and 1950 the alley in question was used by the tenant's
package customers to park when there was no room at the curb.
However, plaintiffs produced no package customers who ever had
used or been instructed to use it, and witnesses who worked in
nearby stores testified that they never saw any such parking.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial
of the injunction, holding that the possession required to preserve a claim and avoid the act's presumption of abandonment 3
must be "open and exclusive, unequivocal, notorious and unambiguous." CarogaRealty v. Tapper, 143 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. 1966).
In an effort to remedy what has been termed the "crisis in
conveyancing, ''4 many states have enacted marketable title acts.5
As land titles grew older and the number of transactions increased, real estate transfers became slow, inefficient and expensive6 due to the increasing number of ancient, technical and
seemingly insignificant defects in many chains of title.7 Title
examiners were confronted with the dilemma of avoiding "flyspecking" and prolonged suits to quiet title, while at the same
time safeguarding their clients.
The Minnesota Marketable Title Act, enacted in an attempt
to insure that "ancient records shall not fetter the marketability
of real estate," s requires that certain interests in real estate be
2. MINN. STAT. § 541.023(6) (1965). "This section shall not . ..
bar the rights of any person, partnership or corporation in possession of
real estate. ..

."

3. MiNN. STAT. § 541.023(5) (1965). "Any claimant under any
instrument, event or transaction barred by the provisions of this section
shall be conclusively presumed to have abandoned all right, claim, interest, incumbrance or lien based upon such instrument, event or transaction . .. ."
4. See Basye, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47
IowA L. REV. 261, 263 (1962); Payne, The Crisis in Conveyancing, 19 Mo.

L. REV. 214 (1954).

See generally BASYB, CLEARING LAND TITLEs §§ 1-8

(1953).

5. Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin have
adopted marketable title acts. See BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES §§ 17284 (1953, Supp. 1966); SIMEs & TAYLOR, IMPROVEMEM OF CONVEYANCING

306-49 (1960).
6. See Basye, Trends and Progress-TheMarketable Title Acts, 47

BY LEGISLATION

IowA L. REV. 261, 262 (1962).

7. See Brehmer, Limitation of Actions Affecting Title to Real Es-

tate, 30 MINN. L. REV. 23, 25-26 (1946); Mahoney, Comments on Minne-

sota Laws, 1943, Chapter 529, Relating to Limitations of Action Affecting

Title to Real Estate, 30 MINN. L. REV. 32 (1946).
8. MINN. STAT. § 541.023(5) (1965). See Wichelman v. Messner,
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recorded within a statutory period to preserve a right of action
on them and to escape the act's conclusive presumption of abandonment.9 The act contains an exception in favor of those in
possession of real estate, 10 added primarily to insure the constitutionality of the act," but also included to protect persons
who fail to record their claims. 12 Thus, the interests of possessors
are protected without prejudicing the rights of prospective purchasers because possession is clear evidence of the possessor's

claim.

13

250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957). There has been some question
whether the act accomplishes its avowed purpose. It has been criticized
for not specifically stating whether a notice of claim once recorded preserves the claim indefinitely, even beyond the forty year period of the
statute. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 176, at 279 (1953). This alleged
defect may not be present at all if subdivision 4 of the act, which provides that the notice of claim shall be discharged in the same manner
as lis pendens notices, incorporates by reference the provisions of Minnesota Statutes § 557.021 (1965) limiting the effective duration of a lis
pendens notice to ten years. See Note, 33 MINN. L. REV. 54, 60-62 (1949).
See generally Snvis & TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 335.
A survey of prominent Minnesota practitioners showed that most
were willing to rely on the act in some if not all of their title examination opinions. See A.B.A. SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST
LAW 95, 102-05 (Proceedings 1956). Therefore, it seems that the act
had beneficial but limited effect even before it passed its first rigorous
constitutional and interpretive test before the court.
9. See note 3 supra.
10. There are other exceptions in favor of the United States Government, railroads and other public service corporations on land received
under congressional or legislative grants, and educational and religious
corporations. MINN. STAT. § 541.023(6) (1965).
11. Various courts have repeatedly held that it is a denial of due
process for a state legislature to compel one who is in possession of land
to resort to legal proceedings within a given period or lose his interest
in the land. This doctrine originated in Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich.
329 (1865), and was popularized in CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LnMTATIONS
365 (1st ed. 1868). It has been approved by the Minnesota court numerous times. See, e.g., Hammond v. Hatfield, 192 Minn. 259, 261, 256 N.W.
94, 95 (1934). See generally Aigler, Constitutionality of Marketable
Title Acts, 50 MI n. L. REv. 185, 192 (1951); Brehmer, supra note 7, at 29;
Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1949). It was probably wise to include the
possessory exception in the act. See 38 MINN. L. REv. 285, 286 (1954).
However, it is arguable that its inclusion should not have been necessary at all since the doctrine arose out of the early courts' hostility to
tax titles not marketable title acts, and since the act does not require
the possessor to go to court within a given time to preserve his rights,
but only to record his claim. See American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S.
47, at 60 (1911); SIMES & TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 257.
12. See Tulane, Title to Real Property-Thirty Year Limitation
Statute, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 258, 264.
13. See PATTON, TITLES § 14 (2d ed. 1957). The Minnesota act is
not as open to this construction as is the Wisconsin act, WIs. STAT. ANN.
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In B. W. & Leo HarrisCo. v. City of Hastings,14 applying the
possessory standard required to constitute constructive notice
under the real estate recording acts to the Marketable Title Act,
the court stated that such possession "must be present, actual,
open and exclusive and must be inconsistent with the title of the
person who is protected by this section. It cannot be equivocal
or ambiguous but must be of a character which would put a
prudent person on inquiry."'8 However, this case did not involve
an easement.
The application of marketable title acts to easements presents
difficult policy problems since easements may serve highly useful
purposes' 6 yet are likely to go unrecorded because their owners
are not actively and continuously concerned with them. 17 Thus,
there is some doubt whether marketable title acts should
apply to easements.' 8 While several states either exclude certain easements, or make specific provision for them, 9 the Minnesota act is completely silent on the subject. The court first dealt
with the application of the Minnesota act and its possessory exception to easements in Wichelman v. Messner.20 In an attempt
to quiet concern over the act's application to certain limited
interests in real estate, 21 the court, assuming that the act applied
to easements, 22 stated:
§ 330.15 (1957), which permits a late recording if no prior purchaser is
prejudiced. See 38 MIn. L. REv. 285,-286. (1954).
14. 240 Minn. 44, 59 N.W.2d 813 (1953), 38 MINN. L. REv. 285 (1954).
15. Id. at 49, 59 N.W.2d at 816-17.
16. See Payne, supra note 4, at 231.
17. See Tulane, supra note 12, at 265.
18. See SnIES & TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 218-31.
19. Michigan exempts "any easement or interest in the nature of
an easement, the existence of which is clearly observable by physical
evidences of its use . . ." and any easement evidenced by the location
above, on, or below the -ground of any physical facility observable or
not. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1274 (1957, Supp. 1966). The Model Marketable Title Act, set out in SnMES & TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 5, § 6,
adopts the first- of these Michigan easement exceptions. Wisconsin includes easements in a separate paragraph of its- thirty year marketable
title act, giving-owners of easements sixty years to file their claims. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 330.,15(5) (1957).
20. 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d- 800, 41 MINN. L. REV. 232 (1957)
(dictum).
21.- The amicus curiae brief in support of the petition for rehearing specifically mentioned leases, mortgages, remainder interests, and
party wall agreements, but strangely omitted easements. The court,
however, included easements in its discussion of the act's effect on limited interests in real estate.
22. This assumption may -not have been absolutely necessary, but
it had been made before, though not by the. court. See BASYE, CLEARING
LAND TITLES § 176, at 278 (1953).
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Possession obviously means actual occupancy or use of part
or all of the real property. Such actual (or constructive) occupancy or use is itself notice of a claim or interest which has not
been abandoned or become nominal. Thus ... right-of-way
easements which are manifested by actual use or 'occupancy'
(consistent with the nature of the easement created) are protected even if the requirement of filing notice is not met. 23

Thus the court, assumed that the act's possessory exception applied to easements. Arguably, however, the possessory exception should not apply since an easement is a non possessory
interest. The exclusion of easements from the exception may
be justified: (1) if the legislature deliberately phrased it so as to
exclude nonpossessory interests; or, (2) if it is mere surplusage
24
unnecessarily inserted to preserve the act's constitutionality.
However, the court concluded that the possessory exception was
included because possession or actual use and occupancy provides
ample notice of a present claim. Consequently, there was no
reason not to apply it to nonpossessory interests such as easements. While the standard of possession set forth in Wichelman
was pure dictum, it was later adopted in United ParkingStations,
Inc. v. Calvary Temple,25 holding: "Only right-of-way easements
'which are manifested by actual use or occupancy' are protected
if the requirement of filing notice is not met. This right-of-way
easement was not 'manifested by actual use or occupancy,'26as the
testimony clearly shows, and was therefore not protected.
In Caroga Realty, the concurring opinion sought to base the
court's decision on the accepted Wichelman standard of possession, although the plaintiffs could not have prevailed even under
this standard.27 However, the majority chose to apply the
stricter Harris standard. In doing so, they seem to have gone
astray in several important respects.
First, the majority failed to consider the obvious, fundamental difference between the "possession" of an interest in fee
as discussed in Harris and the "possession" of a right of way
28
easement. An easement is an incorporeal hereditament, a mere
right of the owner of the dominant tract to use a portion of the
servient tract for a limited, special purpose not inconsistent with
29
the general property interest in the owner of the servient tract.

Thus, an easement is incapable by its very nature of being pos23. 250 Minn. 88, 103, 83 N.W.2d 800, 814 (1957).
24. See note 11 supra.
25.

257 Minn. 273, 101 N.W.2d 208 (1960).

27.

143 N.W.2d 218, 226.

26. Id. at 277, 101 N.W.2d at 211.

28. Sanborn v. Minneapolis, 35 Minn. 314, 29 N.W. 126 (1886).
29. Warner v. Rogers, 23 Minn. 34, 37 (1876).
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sessed, possession of the servient tract remaining in its owner.30
Rather, an easement can only be used or occupied consistently
with the limited and special purpose for which it was created,3 '
as the court in Wichelman clearly recognized.
Second, from the standpoint of constructive notice, the strictness of the Harris standard is understandable since the claim
asserted by the city to the tract in question in that case was for
the fee simple title, allegedly secured by adverse possession which
occurred fifty years before the commencement of the suit. It
would have been contrary to the central purpose of the act to
allow so tenuous a claim to prevail in the absence of either recordation or absolute, unequivocal, and continuous possession.
There would not even have been an ancient record, discoverable
by meticulous title examination, but only an ancient, virtually
undiscoverable possession standing in the way of marketability.
Given the inclusion of the easement in the real estate descriptions
in the conveyances of both the dominant and servient tracts in
Caroga Realty, the court did not need to apply the strict Harris
standard to protect prospective purchasers, since even a cursory
title examination, extending back forty years, would have provided notice of plaintiffs' claim. 32 Nonetheless, the court refused
to create an exception to the literal provisions of the act.33
30. See Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N.W.2d 394 (1945).
31. "An easement is an interest in land in the possession of another
which (a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of the land in which the interest exists .... " RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
(Emphasis added). See Petition of Burnquist, 220
Minn. 48, 55, 19 N.W.2d 394, 398 (1945) (quoting RESTATEMENT).
32. "A purchaser is charged with constructive notice of anything
appearing in any part of the deeds or instruments forming the chain of
title ... which is of such a nature that it would amount to actual notice, if brought directly to his knowledge. . . ." PATTON, TITLES § 348
(1st ed. 1938). See Smith v. Lockwood, 100 Minn. 221, 110 N.W. 980
(1907); BASYE, CLEAMNG LAND TITLES § 138 (1953).
33. The court again refused to adopt this doctrine of notice by recital in United Parking Stations, Inc. v. Calvary Temple, holding that
once an interest is destroyed by operation of the act, any reference to
it in subsequent conveyances is merely for the protection of the prudent
seller and cannot revive the interest. 257 Minn. 273, 101 N.W.2d 208
(1960). The court recognized that this doctrine is in direct conflict with
the fundamental purpose of the recording provisions of the act, since
those interests which the legislature sought to destroy are given life and
those persons presumably protected by the act are faced with new burdens of search. See Jones, The New Jersey Recording Act--A Study of
Its Policy, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 328 (1958). Several state acts have dealt
with this doctrine. The Michigan act specifically provides that the
holder of the unbroken chain of title holds subject to interests contained
in any instrument forming part of that chain, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1271
(1953), while the Colorado act provides that such recitals are binding
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Third, it is obvious that more ancient interests which fetter
the marketability of title would be destroyed if the act included
no possessory exception. If it was included "merely [as] insurance against possible unconstitutionality",3 4 a very narrow interpretation of it would probably be justified. However, if it was
included because possession consistent with the nature of the
interest possessed is sufficient notice of the possessor's claim to
obviate the necessity of recordation, the majority's use of the narrow Harris definition seems unjustified. The majority pays lipservice to the origins of the Harrisstandard in constructive notice
cases, but ignores the fact that none of these involved easements.
Normally, a prospective purchaser of the servient tract is charged
with notice of any visible and open easement.3 5 Even the Wichelman definition is much stricter than this in that it requires an
actual, visible use of the open and visible easement to preserve
the interest. It provides all the notice any prospective purchaser
should need of the existence of the user's claim, while eliminating
ancient, dormant interests.
Finally, the majority's analysis is hampered by overemphasis
of adverse possession considerations. Whether this is a result of
the adverse possession elements of the Harris case; the argu3 6
ments of plaintiffs' counsel concerning Merrick v. Schleuder,
or the similarities between the requirements of adverse possession and possession sufficient to give constructive notice of a
claim, 37 it only confuses the issue. Given the constructive notice aspects of the requirements for securing title to land by adverse possession, a discussion of adverse possession in relation to
easements might have been helpful, but it certainly should not
have been controlling. To gain ownership, of an easement by
only on the parties to the instrument containing them, COLO. REV. STAi.
§ 118-6-8 (1963). The Minnesota act makes no reference to the 'doctrine
and the court refused to imply it. See A.B.A. SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY,
PROBATE AND TRUST LAW

64, 68-71 (Proceedings 1958).

34. 38 AInm. L. REV. 285, 287 (1954).
35. Dozier v. Krmpotich, 227 Minn. 503, 35 N.W.2d 696 (1949).
36. 179 Minn. 228, 228 N.W. 755 (1930). Plaintiffs' counsel cited
Merrick in an unsuccessful attempt to show that the use. of an alley by
an adjoining land owner and his customers are acts constituting adverse
possession and therefore should also constitute constructive notice of a
claim.

Caroga Realty v. Tapper, 143

N.W.2d 218, 225 (Minn. 1966).

37. Possession of a fee to be adverse and, ripen into. title must be
open, hostile, continuous, actual, and exclusive. Newport v. Taylor, 225
Minn. 299, 303-04, 30 N.W.2d 588, 591 (1948). One of the prime reasons
for these strict criteria is to insure that the owner-has ample opportunity
to discover the adverse possession and take steps to preserve his interest.
Therefore, these criteria are quite similar to the constructive -notice
criteria of the Harris standard.
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prescription,3" one's use of the easement must be open, visible,
continuous, unmolested, and under claim of right.30 It seems unnecessary to require as much or more to protect an existing easement than is required to secure a new one by prescription, as the
majority has done.
The majority's interpretation of the Minnesota Marketable
Title Act endangers all easements which by source and age come
within the act's provisions. The only safe course of action for
any owner of such a limited easement is to record it.40 Under
the majority's view, possession of a limited right of way easement
sufficient to satisfy the act's possessory exception is virtually impossible since the maintenance of a continuous, visible, open,
exclusive, unequivocal, notorious, and unambiguous use of an
alley right of way is inconsistent with its normal, limited use as
an access route to the dominant tract. Since plaintiffs in Caroga
Realty were unable to establish any actual or visible use of the
alley during the required period, a decision in favor of the defendant was inevitable. It remains to be seen whether the court
will continue to apply the Harrisstandard when faced with a case
in which the claimants were making an actual, visible use of the
easement, or whether, confronted by the almost conclusive facts
of Caroga Realty, the majority simply overstated its possessory
standard.

Torts: Nonnegligent Participant Liable for
Creation of Hazard
Defendant, a wrecker driver, pushed a stalled automobile
onto a crossover of a divided four-lane highway during the night.
The vehicles were stopped when a second vehicle approached in
the inside lane and collided with the stalled automobile. The
two vehicles, both without lights, remained on the highway; the
wrecker remained on the'crossover. Defendant wrecker driver
switched on the wrecker's lights, secured a flare from a passerby, requested another to call the highway patrol, and walked
down the roadway to warn oncoming traffic. He was approxi38. Prescription is analogous to adverse possession, but is based on
the fiction of lost grant. See Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 14 N.W.
2d 482 (1944).
39. Merrick v. Schleuder, 179 Minn. 228, 228 N.W. 755 (1930).
40. The owner of such an easement would have an even more serious problem if the statutory period for recording his claim has passed
because there is no provision for late recording.
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mately four hundred feet below the accident when he was
passed by a third vehicle. The driver of the latter saw the
wrecker's flashing signal but failed to understand it; he claimed
he did not see any other warning.' Plaintiff, on the scene to
offer assistance, was injured when the third vehicle collided
with the first two. Four to five minutes elapsed between the
two collisions. At trial, all three drivers and the wrecker operator were held liable to plaintiff. The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that defendant wrecker driver, as a nonnegligent participant in creating a dangerous condition on the
highway, had a common law duty to use reasonable care to
correct the situation and to warn others of the danger, and that
the third driver's negligence was not a superseding cause. Zylka
v. Leikvoll, 144 N.W.2d 358 (Minn. 1966).
Generally, one who by his own negligence creates a hazardous condition has an absolute duty to give adequate warning
of its presence or to correct it promptly.2 If the dangerous condition results in injury to another, the actor's liability is based
on his original negligence3 rather than on the nonexistence or
inadequacy of the warning.
When a nonnegligent actor creates a dangerous condition,
his duty is to use reasonable care to warn others or correct the
situation.4 The supporting cases, with one exception, 5 involve
1. Oncoming traffic was confronted with the following: the wrecker's lights, consisting of a red dome blinker light on top of the cab, one
flashing red light on each side of the cab, amber clearance lights and red
rear parking lights; a 2-cell flashlight and lighted flare carried by the
wrecker driver and situated 400 feet below the accident; the flashing
clearance lights and parking lights on a truck belonging to plaintiff's
uncle, parked on the side of the highway 400 feet below the accident.
The third driver saw only the blinking dome light, which he thought
might have been a police patrol car.
2. See PROSSER, TORTS § 54, at 338 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TORTS § 321, comment a (1965).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 437 (1965). In view of the
answers to the interrogatories finding them negligent in the original
collision, the drivers of the first and second vehicles would be liable to

plaintiff under this law, although in the instant case the trial court imposed on them only the duty to use reasonable care. 144 N.W.2d at 367.
4. See, e.g., Hardy v. Brooks, 103 Ga. App. 124, 118 S.E.2d 492

(1961)

(cow killed on roadway); Simonsen v. Thorin, 120 Neb. 684, 234

N.W. 628 (1931)

(trolley pole across street); Montgomery v. National

Convoy & Trucking Co., 186 S.C. 167, 195 S.E. 247 (1938) (trucks jackknifed on slippery hill); PROSSER, TORTS § 54 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND), TORTS § 321 (1965). But see Buchanan v. Rose, 138 Tex. 390,
159 S.W.2d 109 (1942), where a bridge broke under the weight of defendant's truck; the court recognized the duty to warn but refused to
impose it on defendant since the bridge had been defective and thus the
situation was not created by defendant's own act.
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obstructions on the highway. 6 The duty imposed has been "to
take such precautions as would reasonably be calculated to prevent injury."'7 Consequently, the liability of the nonnegligent
actor, as distinguished from that of the negligent actor, has
been predicated upon lack of due care in taking precautions to
warn.
However, circumstances may justify the failure of a nonnegligent actor to warn of a hazard he has created.8 In Wedel
v. Johnsong defendant, without fault, collided' with a horse and
subsequently failed to post a warning. There was no liability
for this failure because the defendant had suffered serious injuries requiring immediate medical attention and was therefore
unable to remove the condition or warn others.
5. Hollinbeck v. Downey, 261 Minn. 481, 113 N.W.2d 9 (1962).
Plaintiff, shagging golf balls on a driving range, was injured by defendant's lofted ball. The court stated that defendant had a duty to warn
or to refrain from acting if he knew or should have known that plaintiff
was in a zone of danger. The case seems distinguishable in that defendant's duty was to refrain from acting rather than to nullify the effect of.
a prior act.
6. Highways are public thoroughfares, available as a matter of
right to vehicular traffic. Ml. STAT. § 169.01(29) (1965). This right
of use would seem to give rise to the duty on one who creates an obstruction to traffic to warn others of its existence. MNw. STAT. § 169.75 (5)
(1965), requiring the use of flares to signal the presence of a disabled
truck, was found to state the measure of due care as to any vehicles
stopped on the highway in Olson v. Neubauer, 211 Minn. 218, 300 N.W.
613 (1941). Highways involve special care: "While only ordinary care
is required, it must be commensurate with the danger. The hazard in
the nighttime on a traffic artery ... is great." Brown v. Murphy Transfer & Storage Co., 190 Minn. 81, 84, 251 N.W. 5, 7 (1933). See Simonsen
v. Thorin, 120 Neb. 684, 234 N.W. 628 (1S31), where the court relied upon
statutory law to impose the duty, based on the total failure of defendant
to take any precautions to warn oncoming traffic.
7. Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 186 S.C. 167,
176, 195 S.E. 247, 251 (1938).
8. The majority did not discuss the wrecker driver's actions in
relation to the four to five minute interval between the two collisions;
however, the dissent persuasively argued that the wrecker driver was
confronted with an emergency situation and consequently his failure to
adequately warn is excused. 144 N.W.2d at 368. The emergency doctrine recognizes that reasonable care is to be measured by a consideration of the existing circumstances. See PROSSER, TOaRTS § 33 (3d ed. 1964).
The doctrine is inapplicable where the actor has created the emergency
through his own negligence but, as the court indicated in Wedel v.
Johnson, 196 Minn. 170, 264 N.W. 689 (1936), it has been applicable
where the defendant is without fault. Logically, it would appear that
the doctrine would be equally applicable to excuse the nonnegligent
wrecker driver in this case.
9. 196 Minn. 170, 264 N.W. 689 (1936). This seems to be the only
Minnesota case recognizing this duty.
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Unlike an actor, a mere bystander, regardless of his knowledge of another's imminent peril, has no obligation to aid or to
warn, 10 but must not affirmatively increase the peril." If the
bystander chooses to act, thereby inducing others to rely upon
2
him, he must act with reasonable care.'
In the instant case, the court described the wrecker driver
as a "participant" without defining this term, and imposed upon
him the duty of the nonnegligent actor to use reasonable care to
warn of the hazard. If indeed the wrecker driver was a nonnegligent creator of the hazard, then the duty was correctly
applied. However, the issue now becomes what the court means
by the use of the term participant. An analysis of prior case
law indicates that the participant as used here may be distinguished from the "actor" on the basis of control. In the past,
the actor has had control over the forces creating the hazarde.g., as in Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking, 3 the
ability to stop and steer a vehicle-albeit he has been found to
be without fault in the way in which he created the hazard.
This requisite control apparently has been dispensed with by
the court in this case. The wrecker driver lacked any ability to
control the first automobile, except as to the initial impetus.
The jury exonerated the wrecker driver from any negligence
in that part of the accident, and the court stated that the vehicle
had not been "pushed ahead 'against [its] brakes' "14 by the
wrecker. Clearly, the wrecker driver lacked the ability to brake
the pushed vehicle in order to avoid the collision.
Arguably, since the wrecker driver was not at fault and not
in control of the forces creating the hazard, he was a mere
volunteer and had no affirmative duty to undertake to warn.
Of course, if the wrecker driver were found to be a volunteer,

10. See
TORTS

§

PROSSER, TORTS § 54 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
314 (1965); Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis

of Tort Liability (pts. 1-2), 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 316 (1908).
11.

See Depue v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907); 5 MINN.

L. REV. 398 (1921); cf. Mazey v. Loveland, 133 Minn. 210, 158 N.W. 44
(1916).
12.

Abresch v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 246 Minn. 408, 75 N.W.2d

206 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 323 (1965); cf. Fjellman v.
Weller, 213 Minn. 457, 7 N.W.2d 521 (1942).
13. 186 S.C. 167, 195 S.E. 247 (1938).
14. 144 N.W.2d at 361. On the issue of control see, e.g., Szyperski
v. Swift & Co., 198 Minn. 154, 269 N.W. 401 (1936) (brief time when

towed vehicle was able to act independently); Hanks v. Landert, 37
Wash. 2d 293, 223 P.2d 443 (1950) (driver of towed vehicle had control
of steering).
(1947).

See also Bakken v. Lewis, 223 Minn. 329, 26 N.W.2d 478
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he might have been found liable on the theory that he undertook to warn other traffic and failed to do so properly. 15 It
seems apparent from the circumstances that the drivers of the
first two vehicles did rely on the wrecker driver to fulfill this
function, and it would seem that he was peculiarly equipped to
do so. However, the court expressly refused to consider the
wrecker driver's contention that be was a volunteer,' since at
trial he neither contended he was a volunteer nor made objection to the court's instructions which did not mention the duties
17
or status of a volunteer.
The court based the application of the duty of the nonnegligent actor to a noncontrolling participant on the existence of
the prior contact between the wrecker and the stalled automobile. No further definition of participant or explanation for the
imposition of the duty to warn appears in the opinion, unless it
may be inferred that the duty arises from the fact that the
nonnegligent party was a wrecker driver, therefore experienced
in the handling of problems at the scene of an accident. There
is considerable language in the opinion to the effect that the
wrecker driver was specially equipped and skilled to fulfill this
duty. Nevertheless, there is nothing specific in the opinion to
prevent the application of the same duty to warn to a person not
a member of the service industry.
15.
16.

See authorities cited note 12 eupra.
The court felt that the wrecker driver was not a volunteer,

suggesting that maybe a joint venture existed between the first driver
and the wrecker operator. 144 N.W.2d at 367. Under Minnesota law, a
joint venture involves both an equal right to voice control and a common
purpose. Winn v. Ski Club of Mayo Foundation, 207 F. Supp. 448 (D.C.
Minn. 1962); Murphy v. Keating, 204 Minn. 269, 283 N.W. 389 (1939).
In Note, 20 Mnix. L. REV. 401 (1936), the author suggests that control is
the central factor in a finding of joint venture, that the doctrine of imputed negligence on this basis is not favored, and that the requirements
are generally strictly construed. See cases cited note 14 supra. Certainly
the common purpose existed in this case; but in a fact situation like
this one, where the stalled vehicle is being pushed and fails to stop in
time, it seems clear that the wrecker driver lacks the ability to exercise
equal control. Finally, if a joint venture could be shown, the duty here
would arise not because of the wrecker driver's participation, but because the other driver's negligence is imputed to him, and the absolute
duty of a negligent actor is imposed.
17. If counsel fails to make timely and adequate objection, the trial
court's charge to the jury becomes the law of the case and binding upon
the court. Mmn. R. Civ. P. 51. Errors in the instruction with respect
to fundamental law or controlling principle may be assigned for the first
time in a motion for new trial. Ibid. Fundamental error may consist in
instructions clearly contrary to recognized public policy or positive
statute. See, e.g., Anderson v. Mid-Motors, Inc., 256 Minn. 157, 98 N.W.2d
188 (1959).
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A comparable situation would be where the driver of the
stalled vehicle negligently steers into oncoming traffic. Assuming a finding that the driver of the pushing vehicle is without
fault, the holding of this case nevertheless imposes on him the
duty to warn. There may be considerable justification for such a
holding where the pusher is in the business of cleaning up
highway collisions, but a considerable hardship may result when
the pushing vehicle is driven by an unknowing, unequipped
neighbor. It seems clear, however, that the holding of the instant case would not impose the duty to warn on a mere passenger, since the term participant, by definition, involves at
least a minimum activity.
There is an obvious utility in imposing the duty to remedy a
dangerous condition on those who have created it. But the
court seemed to indicate a willingness to impose the duty however tenuous one's relation to the creation of the hazard. For
the holding of the case to have further application, the court
must resolve two questions: first, what is the nature of the
participation which will impose the duty; and second, once the
duty is imposed, will the circumstances in which the participant
found himself be considered in deciding whether the duty has
been fulfilled. Perhaps the court is imposing a higher standard
of care on the members of the vehicle service industry.
The second major issue before the court was whether, as a
matter of law, the third driver's negligence constituted an intervening, efficient cause.' One's negligence is the proximate cause
of an injury if the injury is one which follows from the negligent
act or omission in unbroken sequence without a superseding
cause.'0 An intervening force sufficient to insulate the first
20
actor from liability must occur after the original negligence
18. The Restatement defines an intervening force as "one which
actively operates in producing harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
A superseding cause "is an act of a third person
TORTS § 441 (1965).
or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being
liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS § 440
(1965). The Minnesota court evidently uses "efficient intervening cause"
as a synonym for superseding cause. The following discussion will use
the terms as defined by the Restatement.
19. Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., Mpls., & Omaha Ry., 67 Minn.
94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896). See generally Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 MIN. L. REV. 185 (1950); Prosser, The Minnesota Court on
Proximate Cause, 21 MNN. L. REV. 19 (1936); Note, 16 MAUN.L. REv.
829 (1932).
20. See Tandeski v. Barnard, 265 Minn. 339, 121 N.W.2d 708 (1963);
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and operate independently of the situation created by that negligence.2 1 A normal intervening force, for example, an instinctive response to the condition created or a foreseeable force, is
within the scope of the original actor's liability. 22 Where, however, a third actor, fully aware of the circumstances, has the
time and ability to make a conscious choice of action, his choice
is considered an independently23operating force which insulates
the original actor from liability.

The prevailing Minnesota rule as to superseding cause was
first stated in Medved v. Doolittle24 where the driver of an automobile, aware of a truck in his lane of traffic, failed to avoid
that truck:
Where a second actor has become aware of the existence of a
potential danger created by the negligence of an original tortfeasor, and thereafter, by an independent act of negligence,
brings about an accident, the first tort-feasor is relieved of liability, because the condition created by him was merely a circumstance of the accident and not its proximate cause. Where,
however, the second actor does not become apprised of such
danger until his own negligence, added to that of the existing
perilous condition, has made the accident inevitable, the negligent acts of the two tort-feasors are contributing causes and
accident and impose
proximate factors in the happening of the
25
liability upon both of the guilty parties.
Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957); Lee v. Lee, 248
Minn. 496, 80 N.W.2d 529 (1957).
21. See Henjum v. Bok, 261 Minn. 74, 110 N.W.2d 461 (1961). "The
test usually applied is this: Has an independent responsible agent intervened between the first wrongdoer and the plaintiff and the continuous
sequence of events been interrupted or turned aside so as to produce a
result which would not otherwise have followed? If so, the original
wrongdoer ceases to be responsible." Childs v. Standard Oil Co., 149
Minn. 166, 170, 182 N.W. 1000, 1002 (1921).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§ 442A, 442B, 443, 447 (1965).
The intervening negligence of another is not a superseding cause if the
original actor should have realized that a third person might so act,
that the act of that third person is not highly extraordinary, or that the
intervening act is a normal consequence of the condition created by the
original actor.
23. See, e.g., Sowada v. Motzko, 256 Minn. 395, 98 N.W.2d 182
(1959); Strobel v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 255 Minn. 201, 96 N.W.2d
195 (1959); Medved v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 19 N.W.2d 788 (1945).
24. 220 Minn. 352, 19 N.W.2d 788 (1945); cf. Childs v. Standard Oil
Co., 149 Minn. 166, 182 N.W. 1000 (1921).
25. 220 Minn. 352, at 360, 19 N.W.2d 788, at 792. The rule was
adopted verbatim from Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 191 Atl. 43, (1937).
In Kline, a truck had been negligently parked on the highway by defendant. The second defendant drove to the left side of the highway
to avoid the parked truck and collided with plaintiff. The event took
place at night; the parked truck was unlighted. Verdict was obtained
against both defendants. The trial court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the defendant trucker. On appeal, new trial was
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Prior to the Medved decision, the court reached the same decision on substantially the same facts by merely denying the existence of any causal connection between the "standing" and
the collision: "Its presence was known to all; it created no sur'26
prise; it did not obstruct a view of the traffic.
Defendants in the instant case relied on the Medved rule,
contending that the third driver's failure to see several warnings and ignoring the one he did see was an independent act of
negligence. The court distinguished between the two cases on
the ground that in Medved, the driver of the car had "full and
actual knowledge of the hazard ... but failed to respond properly" 27 while in the instant case the third driver did not have
actual knowledge of the obstruction. However, he was apprised
of an obstruction of some kind on the highway while time remained in which he might have slowed sufficiently to avoid the
collision. He testified at trial that he knew the meaning of a
flashing red light, yet he continued to travel at substantially the
same speed for approximately one-half mile until he collided
with the standing automobile. His failure to respond properly to'
the flashing signal seems to involve the same elements of negligence as that held to be superseding cause in Medved.28
The Medved rule has been criticized for this seemingly arbitrary distinction between a negligent failure to see as forseeable, hence concurrent negligence, and negligen-t failure to respond properly to what has been seen as independent, hence
superseding negligence. 2 9 For this reason, the doctrine as originally applied was limited to those situations where it clearly apgranted to both defendants, in order-that the question of whether or not
the second defendant had seen the truck whilethe accident could still
have been avoided could be presented to the jury.
26. Geisen v. Luce, 185 Minn. 479, 485, 242.-N.W. 8,. 11 (1932). The
fact situation was almost identical with that, of the Kline case.
27. 143 N.W.2d at 365.
28. The difference between the so-called chain-of-event cases
and [Medved] is that in the former the second actor... through
his own negligence failed, to see the standing. automobile -in
'time
to get his car under control and avert the accident, or else failed
to see it at all, and thus became committed to a situation which
made the accident inevitable; while in cases like [Medved] the
second actor saw the standing automobile in time to avoid a
collision and could have done so by the exercise of reasonable
care, but did not do so.
Medved v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 363, 19 N.W.2d 78, 793 (1945);
accord, Sims v. Hallett Constr. Co., 247 Minn. 339, 77 N.W.2d 54 (1956).

29. Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA.
L. REV. 121 (1937). The theory has also been criticized for the reason
that there may be some policy excusing the last actor from liability.
PROSSER, TORTs § 49 (3d ed. 1964); Morris, supra note 19.
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peared as a matter of fact that the last actor did have the time
and ability to avoid a collision.30 The present case seems to confirm that limitation upon the application of the doctrine in Minnesota, with the addition of another: the last actor must have
actual knowledge of the nature of the obstruction ahead of him.
Thus, it would appear that the case applies a stricter definition
of independent and superseding cause than has previously been
applied in automobile collision cases.
The additional limitation is one which has been needed in
this area of the law, for the first actor's negligence has clearly
remained a substantial factor in producing the injury and he
should not be relieved from liability unless the last actor has
acted in blatant disregard of all the circumstances.

Torts: Parent Allowed Recovery From
Unemancipated Child
Plaintiff, injured in a two car collision in Wisconsin while a
passenger in her unemancipated son's car, sued both her son and
the other driver for negligence. The defendant son pleaded intrafamily immunity and moved for summary judgment on that
basis. The motion was denied and the defense struck from his
answer. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
under Minnesota law' the intrafamily immunity doctrine is not
a valid defense in actions brought by the parent to recover damages for a tort committed by the child. Baits v. Baits, 142 N.W.2d
66 (Minn. 1966).
Based originally upon the policy that intrafamily litigation
would disrupt family harmony and interfere with the exercise
30. See Kline v. Moyer, -325 Pa. 357, 191 Atl. 43 (1937). For questions to be resolved by the jury see Jeloszewski v. Sloan, 375 Pa. 360,
100 A.2d 480 (1953).

1. Although all parties were Minnesota residents, Wisconsin was
the situs of the tort. In determining the applicable law, the court applied the "center of gravity rule" contained in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
CONFLICT or LAwS § 390(g) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) (domiciliary state
to apply its own substantive law on questions of intrafamily immunity).

See Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936) (domicile state
has a legitimate interest in matters of the family relationship). See also
Lawe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, I[c. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa.
1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). For Minnesota development in this area see
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 250 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957);
Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941).

19661

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

of parental rights and duties, 2 the intrafamily immunity doctrine
has been applied consistently in both child-parent 3 and parentchild 4 suits. However, the doctrine has been criticized by text
writers as unrealistic, 5 and judicial dissatisfaction has produced
numerous exceptions. Thus, the doctrine has been held inapplicable when the tortfeasor was acting in a business capacity,6
when either party died prior to suit,7 or when the tort was will2. Other reasons sometimes advanced to justify immunity have
been: (1) possibility of tortfeasor's succession to the award; (2) analogy to husband-wife immunity; (3) analogy to sovereign immunity;
(4) the criminal law sufficiently protects the child; (5) depleting the
family exchequer. All rationales have been effectively discredited by
the commentators. See, e.g., McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1930); McCurdy, Torts Between
Parent and Child, 5 VnL. L. Rrv. 521 (1960); Sanford, Personal Torts
Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. Rnv. 823 (1956), and cases discussed
therein.
3. Hewelette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), held an
unemancipated child could not recover damages for a parent's willful
tort, but cited no authority for its holding. The Hewelette decision was
quickly followed in two other jurisdictions. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111
Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac.
788 (1905). But see Gould v. Christianson, 10 Fed. Cas. 857 (No. 5636)
(D.C.N.Y. 1836); Nelson v. Johnson, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885);
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) which lend support for liability at
least where the tort was willful or involved gross negligence or neglect.
See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951).
4. E.g., Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 Atl. 498 (1930).
See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1284 (1951), and articles cited note 5 supra. One
jurisdiction dissented. Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Kansas City Ct.
App. 1932). However, Wells was based on a misinterpretation of Dix
v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913), and subsequently has
been limited to apply only when the tort is willful. Baker v. Baker, 363
Mo. 318, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953).
Many of the reasons behind the doctrine are the same as in the
child-parent context. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. Additional reasons given for this immunity were: (1) inconsistent position
of parent as litigant and guardian of the child; (2) negative mutuality
doctrine dictated immunity for children. See .authorities cited note 2
supra.
5. See, e.g., 1 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS 649 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS
677 (2d ed. 1955); 15 MINN. L. REV. 126, 127 (1931); 26-27 NACCA L.J.
151 (1961). The major criticism is based on the insurance factor. The
practical effect of insurance is to eliminate the necessity of family members being true adverse parties at trial and the economic effects upon
the family of a money judgment.
6. See, e.g., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640
(1963); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Lusk v.
Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932), on the rationale the tort was
committed outside the area of family interaction.
7. See, e.g., Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1961);
Dean v. Smith, 211 A.2d 410 (N.H. 1965); Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49,
7 A.2d 461 (1939); Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 (1962),
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ful.8 Three jurisdictions have abrogated the doctrine in negligence casesY
The parental immunity rule was assumed without discussion
or citation of authority by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Taubert v. Taubert.10 Later decisions followed Taubert, declaring that insurance coverage did not alter the rule" and that any
change must come from the legislature. 12 Not until London
Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Smith 3 did the court feel that the application
of the parental immunity doctrine necessitated even a statement
of the policy behind the rule: "[S] ound public policy forbids
such actions as being inimical to the preservation of domestic
tranquility and parental discipline .... ,,14

However, the Minnesota Supreme Court also has limited the
scope of the intrafamily immunity doctrine. The reasoning and
language of London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Smith 5 suggest that the
immunity applies only to cases involving mere negligence, as
contrasted to cases involving wilful torts.' 6
In addition, it has been held that the death of either litigant
in an interspousal suit eliminates immunity, since there is no
longer a need to protect the extinct marital relationship.' 7 Simreasoning the possibility of family discord is removed by death of either
litigant.
8. See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955);
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Cowgill v. Brock,
189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950), on the belief family harmony is already
disrupted due to the willful nature of the tort.
9. Alaska and New Hampshire have rejected the doctrine in
either the parent-child or child-parent context, Frost v. Frost, Alaska
Sup. Ct. (3d Dist. 1963); Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 215 A.2d 695 (N.H.
1965), and it can be presumed that they will follow the lead of Wisconsin in applying it in both contexts. Ertl v. Ertl, 30 Wis. 2d 372, 141
N.W.2d 208 (1966); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193
(1963).
10. 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908).
11. E.g., Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515, 237 N.W. 188 (1931).

12.

See Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W. 1 (1932); cf.

Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924). On the question of
justiciability, see the dissent of Justice Sheran who felt the legislature
was better qualified to make this determination, since it has better tools
to gather the necessary information and the technical experience to better determine if such deeply rooted social policies should be changed.
Baits v. Balts, 142 N.W.2d 66, at 78 (Muhm. 1966).
13. 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954).
14. Id. at 214, 64 N.W.2d at 784.
15. 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954).
16. Id. at 214, 64 N.W.2d at 783 n.3.
17. Pelowski v. Fredrickson, 263 Minn. 371, 116 N.W.2d 701 (1962);
Shumway v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 107 N.W.2d 531 (1961).
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ilarly, since death of the parent or child removes the policy reasons behind parent-child immunity, elimination of the immunity
should follow. Further, the court has been unwilling to extend
the doctrine to bar suits where the beneficiary of a judgment
would be barred in a direct action.' 8 Nevertheless, the court
generally continued to recognize intrafamily immunity in simple negligence cases. However, the child immunity situation had
not been litigated in Minnesota, although one South Dakota case, 19
relying entirely on Minnesota's rule in the child-parent context,
found Minnesota law to conform to the majority rule. The instant case did not repudiate the policy of promoting family
harmony. Rather, it made the affirmative finding that where a
wrong is committed sufficient to warrant recovery were the
parties strangers, the policy of promoting family harmony would
20
best be served by allowing recovery.
In response to the contention that elimination of the child
immunity rule would encourage collusive suits, the court concluded that the injustice of denying recovery far outweighed
the danger of collusion. The court pointed to the lack of evidence
that jurisdictions which have eliminated interspousal immunity or do not have guest statutes have been flooded with collusive
suits.21 Furthermore, to allow danger of collusion to determine
a substantive rule of law would be unwarranted; established judicial techniques are capable of protecting against such abuse.
The court also rejected the argument that elimination of
child immunity would lead to litigation for actionable torts of
insignificant consequences or non-toritious indiscretions of children on the basis that family members are not prone to stir up
serious discord over minor torts. Further, litigation expenses for
minor injuries would diminish recovery so as to make suit unprofitable, and lawyers would be unwilling to prosecute such
actions on a contingent fee basis. Finally, the good sense of juries,
judges, and lawyers is a sufficient check on suits brought by
22
parents over trivial matters.
Although insurance should not create liability where none
18. See Shumway v. Nelson, supra note 17; Albrecht v. Potthoff,
192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934).
19. Kloppenberg v. Kloppenberg, 66 S.D. 167, 280 N.W. 206 (1938).
20. 142 N.W.2d at 74. Balts only eliminates immunity for negligence, since the Minnesota court had previously expressed willingness
to eliminate immunity for willful torts. See London Guar. & Acc. Co.
v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954).
21. 142 N.W.2d at 73.

22. See ibid.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:306

previously existed,23 the instant court's conclusion was strongly
influenced by its view of the practical effect of its decision-com24
pensation in most cases would be paid by insurance carriers.
Allowing suits when there is insuxance will promote harmony
since a third party bears the economic burden of the judgment
and the family members are not true adversaries at trial. However, harmony may not be best promoted by allowing such suits
in the absence of insurance coverage. 25 Family members will
become true adversaries at trial, and the economic effect of the
money judgment will be felt within the family unit. The court
rejected this argument by noting the discord was created by the
commission of the tort rather than the suit. Although it must be
conceded that some discord was already present, to say that
discord resulted from the tort is to beg the question of whether
allowing such suits would promote further discord or would
serve to promote a reconciliation by righting the wrong. Attaching legal blame to the negligent family member may tend to
promote further discord rather than to encourage forgiveness by
the injured party. Allowing the negligent family member to
make reparation on his own would be best since a true reconciliation cannot exist when recovery is pursuant to a judicially
ordered payment of money. On the other hand, it is just to allow
an injured party compensation, and if the negligent family
member will not voluntarily make reparation, it would seem the
existing discord would not be aggravated by allowing recovery.
Practically, the situations where a parent would sue absent insurance coverage are few. Serious intrafamily torts involving
negligence are very infrequently committed except during use of
23. See Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515, 237 N.W. 188 (1931); Baker
v. Baker, 363 Mo. 318, 251 S.W.2d 31 (1952); Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.
2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718 (1961).
24. The ruling was made prospective except as to the case at hand;
immunity was to be applied to torts committed prior to the date of the
decision. 142 N.W.2d at 75. On prospective overruling, see generally
Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51 MAmN. L. REV. 79 (1966).
Prospective application will allow insurance companies time to evaluate
their future policy.
There are three alternatives open: (1) raise liability rates generally; (2) exclude family members from coverage entirely, refusing to
insure the risk; or (3) provide a separate liability policy insuring only
family members. It is not clear whether the latter alternatives would
be allowed in view of the court's reliance on insurance to remove the
possibility of family discord.
25. The number of situations covered by insurance may increase
if householders' liability policies are held to cover family members for
injuries occurring on the family premises as a result of the negligence
of another family member.
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the family automobile. Further, since a child is not held to the
same standard of care as an adult, acts which would constitute
actionable negligence are few, and even then most children are
not financially able to respond in damages. Even if the above
considerations should lead to retention of child immunity in particular situations, it will be time enough to consider them when
squarely presented to the court.
Of particular importance in the instant case is that abrogation of the parent-child immunity rule removes injustices in the
area of contribution. A prerequisite to contribution is that the
injured party must be able to recover from both tortfeasors.
Therefore, a person compelled to pay damages could not recover
contribution from a co-tortfeasor if the latter would be immune
in a direct suit by the injured party.26 Thus, the effect of the
immunity rules was to unjustly thrust the burden of compensation upon one tortfeasor. Further, where a tortfeasor injured a
member of his family while driving a car owned by a nonfamily
member, the Safety Responsibility Act 27 would impose liability
on a person committing no act of negligence. Because of intrafamily immunity, the owner had no right to contribution from
the person actually committing the negligent act. 28 Clearly
Baits will eliminate many of these injustices where a child is a
co-tortfeasor.
Moreover, the reasoning of Baits will have a profound im29
pact on the heretofore well-settled interspousal immunity rule.
Since the Married Woman's Property Act 30 removed the common
law fiction of the legal identity of husband and wife upon which
the rule was originally premised, the sole justification for the
rule has been that such suits would promote marital discord.3 '
The determination in Baits that harmony in the home is best
accomplished by allowing recovery for personal torts compels a
26. See Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956).

27. Mn.

STAT.

§ 170.54 (1965).

28. Miller v. J. A. Tyrholm & Co., 196 Minn. 438, 265 N.W. 324
(1936).
29. The rule that one spouse is immune from suit by the other for
torts committed during coverture has long been established. See, e.g.,
Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920); Strom v. Strom,
98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906). The rule was extended in Woltman
v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189 N.W. 1022 (1922), to cover torts committed prior to the solemnization of the marriage. See Koenigs. v.
Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956).
30. Mnw. STAT. § 519.01 (1965).
31. See Poepping v. Lindemann, 268 Minn. 30, 127 N.W.2d 512
(1964); Pelowski v. Fredrickson, 263 Minn. 371, 116 N.W.2d 701 (1962).
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32
re-examination of the interspousal immunity rule.

Since Balts eliminates any argument that intrafamily suits
will disrupt harmony, it appears that parental immunity should
also be eliminated but with certain qualifications. Parental suits
involve the additional consideration that they may interfere with
maintenance of parental discipline, authority, and respect which
are indispensible to harmonious family relations. 33 In Gofler v.
White,'3 4 the Wisconsin court eliminated parental immunity;
however, provisions were made to leave parental rights and
duties intact by retaining immunity where a parent is acting as
disciplinarian or is performing discretionary duties of parenthood,
such as providing food, clothing, or other necessities. 35 Clearly
retaining immunity in these situations protects against interference with parental rights and duties. In the child-parent context, it appears the Wisconsin approach is the best method to
implement the policies announced in Balts.
Although the court specifically reserved its decision in the
husband-wife and child-parent contexts, 36 its approach indicates,
at the very least, a willingness to examine the policy behind the
intrafamily immunity rules and to assess their validity in light
32. One Minnesota District Court decision, Mosier v. Tarasar, 4th
Jud. Dist., File No. 604245, August 15, 1966, abrogated interspousal
immunity for personal torts committed before solemnization of the
marriage. The judge felt Batts required him to re-examine the policy
behind the immunity and to assess its validity in light of the policy
announced in Baits. He found the determination that harmony will
best be promoted by allowing recovery to be equally applicable to the
situation before him. However, this decision may be reversed if the
case is appealed and the prospective application of Baits is found controlling. See note 24 supra.
33. See authorities cited note 2 supra.
34. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), 1964 Wis. L. Rav. 714.
35. Immunity should, of course, not be a shield for excessive punishment, maltreatment, or gross neglect of the child. See 1964 Wis. L.
REv. 714, 718, for a discussion on the bounds of the Wisconsin rule.
36. 142 N.W.2d at 75. The full import of Baits can be evaluated
only by considering the court's alternative for allowing recovery. The
child in Baits had been emancipated after the tort but prior to suit.
There has never been any doubt a parent could sue his child for a tort
committed after his emancipation, see Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1292 (1951),
because it is no longer necessary to protect the family relationship.
Thus, it should follow that the emancipation of Baits eliminated the
immunity. This argument was presented to the court in the briefs and
at oral argument; recovery being urged on this ground. Brief of Respondent, pp. 13-18, citing Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d
789 (1962) for authority. Significantly, however, the court refused to
so limit the immunity. Instead, the court examined the policy considerations present in the parent-child context and found them to favor
allowing recovery even in cases of simple negligence.
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of our modern society. In view of the reasoning of Baits, such
an examination can only result in elimination of most intrafamily immunity in Minnesota.

Torts: Servant's Contributory Negligence
Not Imputed to Master
Plaintiff, passenger in a truck owned by him and driven by
his employee acting within the scope of his employment, sued to
recover damages for injury to himself and to his truck caused by
a collision with a truck driven by the defendant's employee.
Since both drivers were found negligent, the plaintiff's claim for
relief was denied because the contributory negligence of his
employee was imputed to the plaintiff. The Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed, holding that in automobile negligence cases
contributory negligence of a servant will not be imputed to his
faultless master to bar recovery from a negligent third party.
Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1966).
Vicarious liability renders the faultless principal of an agency
relationship liable for the torts of his agent committed while
acting within that agency. Such liability is commonly justified
as a socially desirable distribution of risk and as a device to
provide financially responsible indemnitors for damages sustained by third parties.' Likewise, if a sufficient relationship of
agency exists to render the principal liable for the torts of his
agent, the contributory negligence of the agent will also be imputed to the principal. 2 Although this well established principle
lends symmetry to the law of agency, it is merely a fictional
relic derived from the original justifications of vicarious liability
premised upon the principal's right to control his agent or the
identity between principal and agent. However, since contributory negligence operates as a bar to recovery from another negligent party, imputed contributory negligence, unlike vicarious lia1.

See 4

BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAw AND PRACTICE,
PROSSER,
AGENCY

§ 2494 (perm. ed. 1946); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS ch. 23 (1956);
TORTS § 68 (3d ed. 1964); see also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcOND),

§ 220 (1958); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk,

38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929); Ferson, Basis for Master's Liability and Principal's Liability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REV. 260 (1951); James,
Vicarious Liability, 28 TuL. L. REV. 161 (1954).
2. See Molden v. Minneapolis, St.P. & S.S.M. Ry., 160 Minn. 471,
200 N.W. 740 (1924); PROSSER, TORTS § 68 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), AGENCY § 220 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 485
(1965).
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bility, cannot be said to be a risk spreading device. Moreover,
because imputed contributory negligence bars recovery by parties who are personally without fault, this "both-ways" rule of
agency has been the subject of extensive criticism.

3

Although the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence
was briefly extended to a number of relationships other than
agency, it was met with such general disfavor that it again became confined to agency and a few family relationships. 4 For
example, there was a rule that the negligence of a driver would
be imputed to a mere passenger,5 but this rule disappeared due
to a distinction drawn between a mere passenger and a passenger
having a right of control over his agent driver.6
The advent of the automobile caused an increase in the number of injuries which, because of unsatisfied judgments, were
left uncompensated.7 As other jurisdictions, Minnesota was
plagued with numerous automobile negligence claims against defendants who were financially unable to discharge their adjudicated liability. To remedy this situation, Minnesota's Safety Responsibility Act s created a statutory agency under which a bailee
3. See, e.g., Fleming, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L.
REv. 340 (1954); Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis. L. REv. 193 (1921);
Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE
L.J. 831 (1932); Henniss, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 26 TEnN. L.
REv. 531 (1959); Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 TEXAS L.
REV. 161 (1934-35); Lessler, The ProposedDiscard of the Doctrine of Im-

puted Contributory Negligence, 20 FoanHAm L. REV. 156 (1951).

4. Minnesota rejected the doctrine of imputing negligence of a
driver to a passenger in Koplitz v. City of St. Paul, 86 Minn. 373, 90
N.W. 794 (1902). However, Minnesota was one of a number of states
to adopt the family purpose doctrine. Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn.
277, 146 N.W. 1091 (1914). The contributory negligence of one spouse
was at one time imputed to the other. See PaOSsER, ToRTs § 116 (3d ed.
1964). Because of the Married Women's Property Acts, however, the
rule was discarded. See, e.g., Olson v. Kennedy Trading Co., 199 Minn.
493, 272 N.W. 381 (1937); MANx. STAT. §§ 519.03, .05 (1965). In Fitzgerald v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 29 Minn. 336, 13 N.W. 168 (1882), Minnesota imputed the contributory negligence of a parent to a child, but that
decision was overruled in Mattson v. Mlinnesota & N. Wis. Ry., 95 Minn.
477, 104 N.W. 443 (1905).
5. See Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849).
6. See, e.g., Tschida v. Dore, 235 Minn. 461, 51 N.W.2d 561 (1952);
Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 N.W.2d 842 (1951).

7. See Corstvet, The Uncomipensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 466 (1936).
8. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1965). Holmes v. Lilygren Motor Co.,

201 Minn. 44, 275 N.W. 416 (1937), stated that the purpose of the
statute was to make owners of automobiles liable to those injured by
their negligent use. See Note, 21 MINN. L. REv. 823 (1937). For similar
statutes in other states see Chamberlain, Automobiles and Vicarious
Liability, 10 A.B.A.J. 788 (1924).
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of an automobile who operates it with the permission of the
owner-bailor 9 becomes the agent of the owner-bailor in regard to
the consequences of negligent operation. This artificial agency
relationship was intended to provide a more reliable source of
compensation for injuries caused by negligent operation of automobiles. Following the apparent intent of the legislature and
the interpretation of a similar New York statute, 0 the Minnesota court held that notwithstanding the language of the statute
and the "both-ways" rule, under the Safety Responsibility Act
the contributory negligence of a bailee of an automobile would
not be imputed to a bailor who was not himself at fault."
The status of imputed contributory negligence under the
Minnesota Safety Responsibility Act is typical of Minnesota's
recent judicial response to that doctrine. Prior to the instant
case, the court limited application of the doctrine to the agency
relationships of master-servant 2 and joint enterprise, 3 and to
claims for loss of services, 4 consortium, or medical expenses of
a person who has been contributorily negligent.
In a far reaching decision, the court in the instant case examined the validity of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence as applied to the master-servant relationship. Noting the
rejection of the doctrine under the Safety Responsibility Act,' 5
the court found no sound reason to reach a contrary result
9. See Flaugh v. Egan Chevrolet Co., 202 Minn. 615, 279 N.W. 582
(1938) (permission given to servant driver equivalent to "scope of employment"); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLum. L. REV. 444 (1954).
10. See N.Y. VEHICLE AN TRAEFic LAW § 388, as interpreted by
Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 60, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1940) (statute does
not impute contributory negligence of bailee to bailor).
11. See Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949);
Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406 (1943).
On the other hand, many jurisdictions held that their statutes created an
agency relationship such that the both-ways rule would apply. See
Birnbaum v. Blunt, 152 Cal. App. 2d 371, 313 P.2d 86 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957); National Trucking & Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64 A.2d 304 (Munic.
Ct. App. D.C. 1949); Di Leo v. Du Montier, 195 So. 74 (La. App. 1940);
McCants v. Chenault, 98 Ohio App. 529, 130 N.E.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1954);
Davis Pontiac, Inc. v. Sirois, 82 R.I. 32, 105 A.2d 792 (1954). However,
other states are in accord with the Minnesota interpretation. See, e.g.,
Westergren v. King, 48 Del. 158, 99 A.2d 356 (Super. Ct. 1953); Stuart
v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 74 N.W.2d 212 (1956).
12. See, e.g., Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 N.W.2d 482 (1951);
see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 486 (1965).
13. See, e.g., Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn. 304, 161 N.W. 715 (1917);
see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 489 (1965).
14. See, e.g., Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489, 65 N.W.2d 917 (1954);
see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS §§ 493, 494 (1965).
15. See note 11 supra.
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when the relationship in question was that of master-servant. 10
The court's approval and reliance upon the rejection of imputed
contributory negligency under the Safety Responsibility Act appear to be justified. Since vicarious liability of both bailors and
masters exists to ensure compensation of parties injured through
no fault of their own, imputation of contributory negligence to
an injured bailor or master not himself at fault would appear to
be the antithesis of that policy. 17 Not only would a faultless
party be denied recovery for his damages from a negligent third
party, but the party whose negligence contributed to those damages would escape liability.
The court also re-examined and rejected the validity of the
master's theoretical right of control over his servant often advanced to justify the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence.
Although that justification may have had some validity in the
pre-automobile era when the right of control could be effectively
exercised by a master riding with his servant, the court found
the right of control to be an absurd fiction in cases involving the
modern automobile.' s Even if a master is a passenger in a motor
vehicle, there would appear to be no effective way to exert his
right of control over the manner in which it is operated by his
servant. On the contrary, any attempt by a passenger to control
the movement of a vehicle may well constitute negligence on
the part of the passenger.' 9 If a master is not riding in his
vehicle, it would be impossible to exert any actual control whatsoever over its operation.
Future application of the instant case may affect other relationships to which the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is presently applied. For example, under the relationship
of joint enterprise, which is based upon a theory similar to that
16. 144 N.W.2d at 544.
17. The authorities are in agreement that the reasons for vicarious

liability do not justify or logically uphold imputation of another's negligence to a faultless party. See, e.g., Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility
and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J. 831 (1931); Note, 17 CORNELL
L.Q. 158 (1931); Note, 34 Alu. L. Ruv. 57 (1950); Note, 21 MfINN. L. REV.

823 (1937).
18. 144 N.W.2d at 545.
19. See Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 49, 47 N.W.2d 482, 487
(1951); Jenks v. Veeder Contracting Co., 177 Misc. 240, 30 N.Y.S.2d 278
(1941).

RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND),

TORTS § 495 (1965) sets out a general

test to determine whether a passenger has in fact been personally negligent. innesota has long used a test similar to this. See Finley v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 71 Minn. 471, 74 N.W. 174 (1898).
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of partnership, 20 each joint venturer is held to have an equal
right of control over the enterprise. Thus, the driver of an automobile is considered the servant of his joint venturer, and both
the negligence and contributory negligence of the former is imputed to the latter. 21 Because a joint enterprise is held to arise
in informal situations, and is used primarily to bar recovery by
injured passengers, 22 the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence in the context of joint enterprise has been strongly criticized. 23 Since joint enterprise would appear to involve the same
considerations as the master-servant relationship, if the Minnesota court were confronted with the question of imputed conto abrotributory negligence in this context, it may feel bound
24
gate the doctrine on the authority of the instant case.
Even though the court in the instant case concluded that the
doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is totally without
logical foundation, the abrogation of that doctrine was limited
to automobile cases. It is unfortunate that this forward step
was taken with such hesitation. Since the court recognized that
there may be other situations in which the doctrine should be
abrogated, however, the instant case may signify the complete
abandonment of imputed contributory negligence in Minnesota.

20. See Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn. 304, at 309, 161 N.W. 715, at
717 (1917).
21. See PROssER, TORTS § 71 at 494 (1964).
22. Ibid.

23. See Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventures, 15 Mnmm. L. REV.
644 (1931); Rollison, The "Joint Enterprise" in the Law of Imputed
Negligence, 6 Nom DAuM LAw. 172 (1931); Weintraub, The Joint Enter-prise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 320 (1931); Note,
20 MINN. L. REV. 401 (1936).
24. Another example is application of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence to claims for loss of services, consortium, or for
medical expenses. RESTATEIIENT (SEcoND), ToRTs §§ 493-94 (1965). The
effect of the instant case upon these situations, however, is uncertain

since the derivative nature of these claims under Minnesota law could
be a basis for distinguishing them.

